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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate and establish culture and identity issues potentially standing 
in the way of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union.  
It has been more than 50 years since Turkey first showed intents to become member of the 
collaboration, which today is called the European Union. In 1999, Turkey was officially recognized 
as a candidate for full membership. Since then the accession process has moved in slow motion or 
reached a complete stalemate. The research, analysis and discussions in this thesis try to provide 
answers to why this is.  
Through theories of ethno-symbolism and Constructivism, identities and social discourse are 
examined in Turkey and in the European Union.  
Whether or not a common European identity exists is, as this thesis will explain, not a question 
easily answered. This thesis is written on the basis that identities are founded in common history, 
culture and political understanding.  
The analysis and discussion in the paper outline arguments that indicate specific differences 
between European and Turkish identity such as ethnic traditions and cultures. Furthermore, 
different views on democracy in Turkey and in the EU are also discussed. It is the conclusion of this 
thesis that these differences arguably create obstacles for a future Turkish membership and possibly 
will continue to do so for a long time.  
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1. Introduction  
Why do we study social interaction? This study is in my opinion essential because social interaction 
can create some of the most dangerous tension in our immediate surroundings. The world and our 
surroundings seem to be decreasing in size as humans evolve and succeed in making the world 
smaller through online options and easier transportation like never before. Because of this, different 
cultures and identities are crossing paths everyday. The importance of maintaining peace despite 
difference is increasing accordingly.  
 
In 1987, Turkey applied for membership of the European Community, which six years later would 
be known as the European Union (the EU). This was not in any way the first time Turkey expressed 
a wish to enter the European collaboration. The country first applied for associate membership in 
the European Economic Community in 1959. In 1963, the European Community and Turkey signed 
an Association Agreement, which would be known as the Ankara Agreement. In Turkey, politicians 
are referring to this as waiting on the doorstep of the EU for more than 50 years1. As the foreign 
minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, said at the 51st meeting of the Turkey-European Union 
Association Council on 27 May 2013: 
“It has been 50 years since the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963. The EU membership has 
been our strategic goal since then”.2  
At the time of writing, Turkey has still not achieved membership.  
The reason for the focus of this thesis is a personal interest in Turkeys potential membership of the 
EU.  
 
In 2012, a “positive agenda” was launched to bring fresh dynamics to the negotiations between the 
European Union and Turkey. From an economical perspective Turkey is arguably becoming a more 
lucrative partner for the EU. The economy in Turkey has increased steadily the last couple of years 
and the country had the highest growth rate in the world in 2010 and 2011, only exceeded by China 
in 2010. 3 
The development of international relations and globalisation are issues arguably making it 
increasingly difficult for the European Union to disregard the question of Turkish EU membership.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Zaman, Today's. Today's Zaman. 04. February 2013, accessed 14, December 2013, 2	  Affairs, Republic of Turkey: Ministry of Foreign. 27. May 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-
minister-davutoglu-_eu-membership-has-been-our-strategic-goal-for-almost-50-years-and-will-continue-to-be.en.mfa 3	  Udenrigsministeriet. Danmark i Tyrkiet, Udenrigsministeriet . 10. January 2013, accessed 5, December 2013, 
http://tyrkiet.um.dk/da/om-tyrkiet/tyrkiets-historie-og-politiske-situation/oekonomisk-situation/	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Since Turkey was accepted as a candidate country for membership of the EU in 1999, many 
changes have been made in the Turkish society. 4 The changes have not yet led to any finalizing 
negotiations. At the same time, Turkey’s political leaders have begun criticizing the EU for stalling 
the accession process. Among many things, Turkish leaders are criticizing the EU for having double 
standards towards candidate countries and their abilities to fulfil the asked criteria for accession. 
Furthermore there has also been speculation and critique against the EU for not admitting that the 
accession process is being stalled because the EU is hesitating to grant membership to a country 
that has a majority of Muslim citizens.5 
 
By making a comparative analysis of culture and identity in Turkey and the EU, and a critical 
discourse analysis of political texts from both Turkey and the EU, I aim to describe the difficulties 
and reasons for disagreement between Turkey and the EU. With the results from the analysis the 
scope of the thesis is to seek validation for my hypothesis: The European Union’s hesitation or 
reluctance to accept Turkey as a full member is not only due to political and economical demands 
not being met, but also has to do with differences in culture and identities.  
The debate on globalisation has a tendency to focus on economical advantages, cheaper 
employment and other trade and industrial benefits. This is not to disregard, but as much as the 
above mentioned describes some important aspects of globalisation, it is also very much about how 
populations interact despite differences.  
1.2 Research questions  
1. What characterises European identity? 
2. What characterises Turkish national identity? 
3. In which ways might expressing this Turkish national identity influence EU’s political leader’s 
attitude toward Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
4. What characterises the way the EU’s political leaders are identifying Turkey in talking about 
future EU enlargement? 
5. In which ways might these differences influence Turkey’s accession to the EU? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Heron, Tomas. Folketinget, EU-oplysningen . 07. November, 2011, accessed 15, December 2013, http://www.eu-
oplysningen.dk/spsv/off/alle/tyrkiet/  5	   Harding, Luke. The Guardian . 07. June 2013, accessed 15, December 2013, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/erdogan-accuses-eu-hypocrisy-turkey-protests 	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1.3 Literature review  
With this literature review I want to show you, the reader, where I have found inspiration from and 
interest in the topic, but more importantly this literature review is a mean to emphasise areas in the 
discourse where I believe to see important aspects that could be developed.  
Many have studied the enormous topic the European Union and found the intricate relationship 
between Turkey and the EU interesting. This have led to numerous discussions, articles, papers, 
books etc. all trying to enlighten the reader and bring attention to the many aspects of the EU, not to 
mention the tensions and outcomes of the potentially historic relationship between what many 
would describe as a predominant Islamic culture and a predominant Christian culture.  
 
I will in the chapter on theory explain the theories in this thesis further, but as it was a great part of 
finding my focus, I want to mention Anthony D. Smith’s “Nationalism”6 and Steven J. Mock’s 
work “Symbols of defeat”7 which both focus on the ethnic, the past. Both authors are handling a 
difficult field of research, a field that will never cease to raise questions, and a field that deals with 
how formation and building of nations and identities come to be. The importance of why we as 
individuals seek to form groups, in order to find meaning and purpose, a way to organise and find 
others willing to submit to the same culture of rules and laws. Both authors define theories of 
nationalism, nation and identity.  
 
The scope of this thesis is to contribute to the current discourse on Turkey and EU relations.  
In the book “Europe: An Unfinished Adventure” Zygmunt Bauman8 very eloquently describes the 
core values of the European Union that according to him are the cornerstones of a collaboration 
across boarders. According to Zygmunt Bauman “Rationality”, “Justice” and “democracy” are three 
important values forming the mind of the European citizens. The constant pursuit of these values 
establishes a European identity. He emphasizes that despite the many different forms of democracy 
through out Europe one can argue that they originate from the same train of thought, which is why 
we can find similar core values that helped shape the democracies in Europe.9  Arguably the EU has 
moved into an era of economic instability, raising nationalism and internal power struggles. I agree 
with Zygmunt Bauman in his analysis and thoughts on the matters of the European Union being in a 
difficult situation, seeing how the world is developing. He expresses the need for the EU to once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   Smith, D. Anthony. Nationalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001.	  
7  Mock, J, Stevens. Symbols of defeat in the Contrucktion of National Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
8 Bauman, Zygmunt. Europe: An Unfinised Adventure . Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 
9 “Europe: An Unfinised Adventure .” Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, p.	  126	  -­‐	  129 
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more strive to attain the same hunger for adventure, the same passion for creating politics together, 
that will help our common task of coping with still growing problems, European as well as global. 
He strongly believes that the answer lies within an ever-closer union; he even speaks of a budding 
European federation.10 As an important note Bauman writes in 2004, before the severity of the 
economic crises struck. In terms of a European federation I do not find reason to believe that that 
will ever become a reality. I do however find reasons to agree with Zygmunt Bauman on his 
perspectives on the foundations for a common European identity.  
The potential membership of Turkey is not mentioned in Bauman’s book, which is why I want to 
research further on this subject and look into the matter of how Turkey would adapt to an European 
identity as described by Zygmunt Bauman. 
 
The Danish professor Uffe Østergård also focuses on EU/Turkey relations in writing about the 
above mentioned and debated common European identity in his book “Europa: Identitet og 
Identitetspolitik”.11 He discusses the difficult question of whether or not a common European 
identity exists. He identifies the old heritage of Turkey, the cruelties of the Ottoman Empire as a 
reason for why some Europeans still associate Turkey with the “other” and a threat to the Christian 
Europe.12 According to Uffe Østergård it is wrong to identify Europe with a Christian character. I 
concur with his point that there have been other directions of religion or political ideologies along 
side Christianity in much of Europe’s history.13 My question is whether or not it is wrong to argue 
that Christianity is a common character when talking about European identity. How much does this 
Christian heritage in Europe have to do with the fact that Turkey is still being held at “safe 
distance” from the EU? It is my personal opinion that religion should be of little matter, Christianity 
or Islam. We should be able to co-exist peacefully as have been made possible between the 
members of the European Union since the Second World War. At the time of writing, I do 
unfortunately not believe this to be possible between the EU and Turkey. Uffe Østergård wrote his 
book in 1998 before the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and before the EU was faced with the economical 
crisis. He argues that Islam potentially could be a positive contribution to European civilisation. 
The quote below is translated from Danish into English. He writes on the third to last page of the 
book:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid., p. 131. 
11 Østergård, Uffe. Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik . Viborg: Munksgaard/Rosinante, 1998. 
12 “Europa: Identitet og Identitetspolitik.” Viborg: Munksgaard/Rosinante, 1998. p. 146. 
13 Ibid., p. 381 
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“In the next century it will be impossible to overlook the role of Islam in Europe as well as 
outside.”14 
Can Islam become a well-integrated part of the Europe Union? Following what has happened in the 
world since Uffe Østergård wrote his book, I see this as one of the biggest challenges facing not 
only the European Union.  
 
My thoughts on this thesis have been formed by the above questions relating to cultures and identity 
when talking about why Turkey is not yet a member of the EU. In ”Trials of Europeanization”15 the 
aim of the book is to give the reader an overview of what Turkey’s decision to pursue membership 
of the EU has meant to the political culture of the country. In the book, the author speaks of a 
concept called the spill-over process. In the context of the book, the spill-over effect is either 
political or functional, 16  but put in the context of this thesis one could ask: What if the concept 
where to deal with culture, religion and identities? What have this spill-over effect then been given 
EU and Turkey through the years of the accesstion process? 
 
The work of Jesper Møller Sørensen and Erik Boel “Tyrkiet – på vej gennem EU’s nåleøje”17 is in 
my opinion a well written publication that provides the reader with a good understanding of Turkey 
as a country and also an overview of the long and difficult accession process and difficulties that 
have existed and still exist between the European Union and Turkey. It is important to note that the 
above-mentioned publication, like this thesis, is written without the insight that a native might have, 
but based on knowledge from interviews, translated text and documents.  
What especially caught my eye and interest were the authors describing the battle of culture in 
Turkey. It is an introduction to an internal battle of cultures in Turkey, an effect of the building of 
the Turkish nation and its identity following Kemal Atatürk. 18  Kemal Atatürk is to this day still is 
called the father of the Turkish nation, but can accordingly also be defined as the man who started 
the current battle of cultures in Turkey, seeing as he was the ruler who banned religion from public 
space. 19  With time comes change and for Turkey and the Turkish people the time following Kemal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., p. 387. 
15 Grigoriadis, N. Ioannis. Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union . New York : Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2009. 
16 ”Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and The European Union.”  New York : Palgrave Macmillian, 2009. p. 7. 	  
17 Sørensen, møller Jesper, and Erik Boel. Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje. Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. 
18 “Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje.” Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 85.   
19 Ibid., p. 88.  
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Atatürk have been a roller coaster of change, cultural and politically. I want to build upon this and 
focus on the battle of cultures not only in Turkey, but also between Turkey and the EU. 
1.4 Context 
1.4.1 The European Union (the EU) and the ongoing enlargement 
Many in The EU view integration and enlargement as way to promote peace, stability, democracy 
and prosperity.20 In 1993, the Copenhagen European Council defined requirements candidate 
countries need to fulfil in order to join the EU. The council also concluded that accession could take 
place as soon as candidate countries are capable of fulfilling these requirements. 
The criteria for membership require candidates to adopt political and economic EU-values by 
achieving “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary 
union.”21 
 
Accession talks begin with a process to determine if the country meets the EU’s rules and 
regulations. The rules and regulations – also known as the “acquis communautaire” – have 35 
chapters. The European Commission proposes common negotiating positions for the EU on each 
chapter, which must be approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers. Chapters of the acquis 
can only be opened and closed with the approval of all member states. Each year, the Commission 
publish reports, assessing the progress made by a candidate country. Once the Commission 
concludes negotiations on all 35 chapters, with an applicant a draft accession treaty is submitted to 
the council for approval and to the European Parliament for assent. After approval by the Council 
and Parliament each EU member state and the candidate country must ratify the accession treaty.22 
In 2004, the largest expansion of the union happened when the EU accepted 10 new member states. 
In January 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined as well. With the accession of Croatia on 1 July 
2013 (after eight years of negotiations), the Union now has 28 member states.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  European Commission. Understanding Enlargement - The European Union’s enlargement policy. Bruxelles: European 
Commission, 2011.	  21	  European Commission, The Copenhagen criteria 1993, accessed 14. December 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/enlargement/criteria/index_en.htm	  22	   Archick, Kristin. European Union Enlargement. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013. p.	  1	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Currently, there are four candidate countries besides Turkey. Montenegro was given candidate 
status in December 2010 and opened accession negotiations with the EU on June 19, 2012. Serbia 
was granted candidate status in March 2012 and could begin actual negotiations by January 2014. 
Macedonia has a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, but Greece and Bulgaria 
have blocked the Macedonian negotiation.23 Iceland began the accession process in July 2010, but 
in 2013, the Icelandic government announced that it is suspending the accession process.24  
1.4.2 Political situation between the EU and Turkey 
Turkey started accession talks in October 2005, but at the time of writing, only 14 chapters out of 
35 has been opened in eight years and only one has been closed25. Croatia began membership talks 
on the same day as Turkey, but has already finished the whole process – the country became the 
28th member on July 1 2013.  
Looking back at the eight years since Turkey started the accession talks, one could argue that 
negotiation talks and the debate climate between Turkey and the EU now is at an all-time low. Both 
the political negotiations and the public opinions in Turkey and in the EU about Turkey’s accession 
are characterised as being in a worse shape than in any previous time during the years that have 
gone by.  
Scholars26 point to the spring of 2012 as the beginning of a process that might have led to the 
stalemate of today.  
In May 2012, the EU Commission launched an agenda on Turkey, which EU labelled as “positive”. 
The intent was to kick-start EU-Turkey relations, the EU said.  
In the years that followed, the EU published four reports which all expressed disappointment with 
Turkey’s progress: In October 2012, the European Commission published its annual assessment of 
the progress of the candidate countries, including Turkey. In December 2012, the European 
Council’s published its “conclusions” on enlargement. In April 2013, the European Parliament’s 
published its Progress Report on Turkey. And in October 2013, the European Commission again 
published its annual progress rapport. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Barber, Tony. Financial Times. 12. September, 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d4d383a-
13bd-11e3-9289-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qXrHcJSP 
24 Pop, Valentina. Euobserver. 13. September, 2013, accessed 17. December 2013, http://euobserver.com/enlargement/121419 25	  Commission, European. www.europe.eu. 05. November, 2013, accessed 14. December 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-958_en.htm 26	  Morelli, Vincent L. European Union Enlargment, A Status. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013.	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The criticism in these rapports included, among other things, lack of freedom of expression and lack 
of media freedom. There was also criticism of Turkey’s refusal to recognise Cyprus and the EU 
presidency, which at that point in time was Cypriote.  
In spite of the criticism, EU member states agreed in early 2013 to support a proposal from France 
about opening a new chapter of the acquis, namely chapter 22, Regional Policy. Up until now only 
13 out of 35 chapters had been opened.  
Negotiations were set to begin in June 2013. In the end of May though, events in Turkey started to 
induce new problems. Public protests erupted in Turkey over the future of a park, but then turned 
into protests demanding basic rights and freedoms in reaction to violence committed by the police 
against the protesters spread across Turkey. According to assessment made by the Turkish Medical 
Association (TMA) on 15 July 2013, 8163 people were injured in demonstrations across Turkey. 5 
people lost their lives. According to declarations made by the Ministry of Interior on June 22th, 
protest occurred all around Turkey except in Bayburt and Bingöl. 2,5 million people attended the 
protests.27  
After Turkish authorities cracked down on the protestors, renewed criticism from the EU was 
raised. A resolution from the European Parliament expressed its “deep concern at the 
disproportionate and excessive use of force by the Turkish police.”28 Turkish government officials 
replied with harsh words about the EU.  
Several EU member states warned that they would postpone accession talks. In the end the EU 
agreed to open the new chapter, but to postpone the accession negotiations until October.  
On November 5, Turkey and the EU opened the 14th chapter, Chapter 22 on regional policy. Even 
though the EU as well as Turkey expressed hope that more chapters would open soon, France has 
conveyed the message to Turkey that it will not lift its veto on four chapters until after the European 
Parliament elections that will be held in June 2014. 
1.4.3 Public opinion in Turkey and in the EU 
EU membership seems to have lost its appeal for many Turks. In 2004, 62 percent of Turks asked 
said that a Turkish membership of the EU would be a good thing, and only 12 percent said it would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  The	  economist. »The economist.« The economist. 8. June, 2013, accessed 12. December 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579004-recep-tayyip-erdogan-should-heed-turkeys-street-protesters-not-dismiss-them-
democrat-or-sultan  
28 European Parliament. www.europarl.europa.eu. 13. June, 2013, accessed 09. December 2013, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P7-RC-2013-0305&language=EN  	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be a bad thing. In 2012, 36 percent said that Turkish membership would be a good thing, while 33 
percent said a bad thing, the Eurobarometer polls show. In 2013 alone, the Turkish public opinion 
about the EU took a rollercoaster ride. In a Eurobarometer poll published in September, only 43 
percent of the Turkish citizens viewed the EU positively, as compared with 60 percent six months 
earlier. 29 
Turkey’s economy continues to thrive. Many Turkish citizens or Turks seem to feel that a 
membership in the EU is no longer needed in order to secure Turkey’s status. In 2005, only 16 
percent of Turks said that Turkey’s economy was doing better than the average of the European 
Union countries. In 2013 that percentage had increased to 56 percent a large shift in opinion 
observed through Eurobarometer polls.30  
European support for Turkey’s accession among citizens of EU member states has been lukewarm 
at best, and now it seems even more ambivalent than before. This opinion may be due to internal 
crisis of upholding democratic standards with newly accepted membership countries, which 
arguably affect the attitude towards the acceptance of more countries such as Turkey. These internal 
events or crises are for example the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; where 
democratic and human rights written into the European treaties, were disregarded. Another crisis 
that arguably can have affected opinion among EU citizens is the Romanian rule of law crisis in the 
summer of 2012.31 The latest Eurobarometer poll concerning opinion among EU citizens about 
Turkey is from 2008, the poll shows that 36 percent of the European citizens are in favour, where as 
44 percent are not in favour of the membership.32   
2. Method  
In the following chapter I describe the methods and the collection of data gathered and examined in 
order for this thesis to have been written.   
I have chosen to work with a deductive approach. By using this approach my analysis has been 
conducted as a mean to research the validity of my hypothesis and use of theory. Had I chosen to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Eurobarometer. hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm  30	  Eurobarometer. hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm	  
31 Buckley, Neil, James Fontanella-Khan, og Kester Eddy. 11. July, 2013, accessed 13. January 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3901b64c-ea12-11e2-913c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qIuVw18B  32	  	  Eurobarometer. hec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm	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work inductively, it would have meant initiating the work process without a hypothesis as a starting 
point, but instead letting observations and empirical data form the structure. 
By working deductively results from the analysis will then either confirm the theories and 
hypothesis or indicate other possible theories than the ones initially thought out.33  Both the 
deductive and inductive approach have their limitations or weaknesses. The inductive approach can 
be overwhelming in the amount of empirical data where important points have a possibility of being 
overlooked. The deductive method on the other hand has a danger of becoming too narrow, where 
subjective opinions can create blind spots.  
It is important to be aware of these risks and limitations. I knowingly focused on a deductive path; 
working as objectively as possibly, as I believe this to be most fruitful for the findings and 
arguments of this thesis.   
2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Historically speaking, CDA is a rather new discipline. Nothing develops more, or provides better 
insight than when knowledge is shared and discussed. A group of scholars decided to get together to 
discuss the many ideas and different perspectives on CDA. This formed a CDA network of 
distinguished scholars such as Gunter Kress, Theo van Leeuwen, Teun Van Dijk, Norman 
Fairclough and Rut Wodak, following a small symposium in Amsterdam in 1991.34 
The method of CDA is said to be an offspring of Critical Linguistics (CL), which emerged in the 
1970s. CL and CDA are related. Whereas CL often uses the perspective of those who suffer, CDA 
has another use and understanding of the concept “critical” as CDA wants to uncover and clarify 
the political ideologies and influences in the language of those in power, the people who actually 
are responsible for the existence of inequalities - and who has the power to change it.35 The high 
emphasis on the ability to be “critical” indicates inspiration from the Frankfurt School or Jürgen 
Habermas as “critical linguistics”.36 A further interpretation of taking a critical approach is in the 
opportunity to distance one self from the text, to se the interconnectedness of things and go beyond 
the actual words to also examine meaning and context.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Olsen, Henning. Kvalitative kvaler: Kvalitative metoder og danske kvalitative interviewundersøgelsers kvalitet . Danmark: 
Akademisk, 2002. p. 110-115 
34 Wodak, Ruth, Michael Meyer, Siegfried Jäger, van, A. Teun Dijk, Norman Fairclough, og Ron Scollon. Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 4 
35 ”Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Sage Publications.” 2001. p. 10-11 36	  Ibid., p.	  2	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CDA is not a locked method but a method developed and examined by many scholars, some of 
them mentioned above, contributing their take on how CDA works to its best abilities in retrieving 
results in analysis. A general explanation or features required in the different variations is that it is a 
useful method when ones aim is to examine social dilemmas.  
CDA is oftentimes used in analysing political speeches. One of many examples is Ruth Wodak’s 
use of CDA in analysing speeches of ministers and heads of government as part of what she calls 
the field of control.37  
For my thesis this method is very suitable since I have chosen political texts from the president of 
the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso38 and the president of Turkey, Recep Tayip 
Erdogan39, as part of my investigation and validation of my hypothesis. 
CDA requires descriptions and analysis of social processes and structures in all levels (personal, 
groups and society) and includes the concepts of power, the concept of history, as well as the 
concept of ideology.40 There are several different CDA approaches, no one is considered the “right 
one”, but diversity is important. As mentioned CDA is said to critically defend any inequality or 
point out power abuse practised through discourse. The method is used to show how the privileged 
use linguistic means to stabilize or intensify their power and the inequalities of society.  
Teun A. van Dijk, professor of Discourse Studies at the University of Amsterdam, contributed to 
the learning’s of CDA with several publications, starting back in 1984 where he wrote his first book 
on racism “Prejudice in Discourse”. He has lectured widely in Europe and America and has very 
strong opinions about CDA as being discourse analysis focusing on social problems with a political 
attitude, as Van Dijk expresses it, “CDA is biased – and proud of it”.41 I structure my analysis 
according to the principals of Van Dijks multidisciplinary CDA method. The multidisciplinary 
CDA is focused on diversity and the importance of combining both discourse and social structures 
in an analysis of specific social relations. This diversity is explained in Van Dijk’s discourse-
cognition-society triangle. The triangle indicates how different aspects are equally important and 
useful for a critical analysis, especially in defining the context for the “communicative event” to be 
analysed.42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Ibid., p. 68 
38  Commission, The European. www.ec.europa.eu. xxx. xxx, 2014, accessed 03. January 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/about/cv/index_en.htm 
39  Sørensen, møller Jesper, and Erik Boel. Tyrkiet - på vej gennem EU's nåleøje. Viborg: Gyldendal, 2005. p. 192 40	   Wodak, Ruth, Michael Meyer, Siegfried Jäger, van, A. Teun Dijk, Norman Fairclough, og Ron Scollon. Methods of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 2001.	  p.	  3	  
41 ”Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.” London: Sage Publications, 2001. p. 96  
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The analysis of the two texts is initially structured through findings of the “semantic 
macrostructure”. Finding the macrostructure is done by location of general topics; topics that can 
help define and establish what discourses exist within the text and what it is about on a global level. 
Van Dijk distinguishes between local and global. The global meaning of the texts is emerging and 
understood through the micro or local meaning of the texts.43  
To ensure a prober understanding and analysis of the texts, the local meanings of the texts, as Van 
Dijk calls them, are investigated. The local meanings in the texts are studied, such as the meanings 
of words, the structure of propositions, and relations between propositions. Local meanings are the 
result of the selection made by speakers or writers in their mental models of events. It can also be 
their general socially shared beliefs. This is the type of information that influences the mental 
models the most, meaning that they also are the ones, which influence the opinions of the 
recipients.44   
2.2 Data collection   
2.2.1 Speeches  
The scope of this thesis is to research and analyse culture and identity aspects in the EU and in 
Turkey, in trying to find out if these are playing a role in the obstruction of the chances of Turkey 
becoming a full member of the EU. The empirical data or texts are in this case political speeches 
addressed to European and Turkish politicians and citizens. In the analysis I discuss and interpret 
the written texts from speeches given by as mentioned José Manuel Barrosso, the current president 
of the European Commission, and the current prime minister of the Turkish republic, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan. The speech given by Barroso is the annual state of the union speech, held on the 13th of 
September 2013 at the European parliament plenary session in Strasbourg.45 Erdogan originally 
held his speech at a group meeting with his political party, AK.46 I have chosen these speeches 
because they represent leaders from the two instances in focus; furthermore the target groups of the 
speeches are citizens, the heart of the nations, and political leaders who are in the position of 
actively affecting change. The citizens might not be participating at the physical place where the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Ibid., p. 102 
44  Ibid., p. 103-106	  
45  Barroso, Manuel, José. 11. September, 2013, accessed 02. November 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
684_en.htm   
46 Erdogan, Tayyip, Recep. Justice and Development Party. 25. June, 2013, accessed 03. November 2013 
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speeches were given, but in this assignment the online accessibility of both speeches is argued as 
ground for the citizens in the EU and Turkey also being viewed as targets for the substance of 
speeches.  
2.2.2 Interviews  
In the introduction I explain the problems and topic of research. Getting to the right topic and 
deciding on a structure and method has been a long road with many doubts and difficult decisions. 
As a result the topic has been corrected, limited in scope and improved along the way.  
In the process of finding the right research design I very early decided that I would incorporate 
expert interviews as an addition to the gathered empirical data. As explained the topic changed a bit 
along the way, which happened accordingly with the knowledge gained from the empirical data. 
This is important to note in terms of the interviews conducted. A couple of the questions asked are 
related to the earlier design and line of research questions. I will defend that these interviews are 
still valuable as expert knowledge and as empirical support. In the following I outline whom I 
interviewed, why they are relevant and the design of the interviews.  
 
In the art of interviewing there are elements difficult to predict, you are dealing with people that 
might be situated elsewhere or have busy schedules. Equal to working with a research project, you 
cannot always foresee how it will develop or what obstacles you might come across. What I had 
initially planned were qualitative semi-structured face-to-face expert interviews with open-ended 
questions.47 This type of interview would have allowed the interviewees to elaborate on issues of 
particular interest and for the interviewer to possibly go beyond the structured questions and 
contribute further meaning and understanding to the research.  
I found two experts, to whom I am grateful, willing to contribute to this project. Searching for 
interviewees I came across the first of the two experts at a lecture on “Liberalism and Democracy in 
a Turkish Model” held by professor Omer Taspinar at University of Copenhagen, School of Law on 
the 4th of October 2013. I participated in the lecture out of interest, but I had done a little research 
before hand and learned that Mr Omer Taspinar was an expert on EU and Turkey relations. After 
the lecture I approached the professor with the request of a possible interview. As a director of the 
Turkey project at Brookings institute in Washington, professor at the National War College and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   Olsen, Henning. Kvalitative kvaler: Kvalitative metoder og danske kvalitative interviewundersøgelsers kvalitet . Danmark: 
Akademisk, 2002.	  p.	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adjunct professor at John Hopkins University in the United States,48 circumstances would have that 
Mr Omer Taspinar was only in Denmark for the abovementioned lecture. In our conversation after 
the lecture he kindly agreed to a written interview, I mentioned an interview on Skype as a 
possibility, so that it would still be face-to-face, but due to a busy schedule and travels he preferred 
correspondence through e-mail.  
In a face-to-face interview it is essential before beginning the actual interview to create 
confidentially between the interviewer and interviewee, especially important in the respect of the 
interviewee’s willingness to answer honestly. This can be achieved by clearly explaining the design 
of the interview, topic and field of research in an interview guide. Furthermore it is important to 
explain the context of the interview and how it afterwards will be implemented; in this case what 
importance it would have in this thesis. Without the opportunity to do the interview in person, the 
confidentiality process and outlining of the interview was instead presented in an introduction letter 
to the interview questions send by e-mail. The interview being in writing created a more structured 
interview, where as the face-to-face interview would have allowed for questions to be asked in a 
less structured order or left out in total according to what direction the interviewee wanted to go. 
The open-ended questions send by mail still provided the experts with opportunity to elaborate and 
go beyond the questions if they wanted to. The lecture given by professor Omer Taspinar, which I 
actively participated in, will also be an addition to the interview. 
 
Daniella Kruzmanovic is a professor at Copenhagen University belonging to the Department of 
Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies.49 She is introduced as the second expert interviewee. 
Searching for experts in my field of research, I wanted to locate an expert able to meet personally, 
which would mean it would have to be an expert situated in Denmark or willing to conduct an 
interview via Skype. I came across Daniella Kruzmanovic on the Internet; she has authored several 
publications on matters of the EU and Turkey, which indicated that she had expert knowledge and a 
good understanding of the subject. In our initial mail correspondence, in which I asked if she would 
be willing to participate in an interview, she wrote that had timing been differently she would have 
been more than willing. Unfortunately she was just about to leave the country for a longer period of 
time at the time of our correspondence. Because I myself had a limited amount of time, and her 
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profile so perfectly fitted the scope of this thesis, it was agreed, like the previous, to conduct the 
interview in writing.  
Unlike Mr Omer Taspinar, Professor Daniella Kruzmanovic because of her travels, only had a few 
days to reply. I had my interview guide or letter of introduction from the earlier interview, which I 
send her by e-mail, along with her request of the questions being restructured and deducted to three 
important questions. In the limited time she thought it best to give more time to a few answers with 
depth and careful thought, than short hurried answers to many questions. The answers I received 
were well thought through, descriptive and of great use to further process of this thesis.  
All questions and answers can be found in the appendix.  
3. Theory 
In this chapter, I explain the theories I have chosen to support and help enlighten and argue the 
focus of dilemma between the EU and Turkey and validity of my hypothesis. I operationalize the 
theories chosen in the later analysis chapter.  
3.1 Theoretical delimitation  
In this section, I define the theoretical choices that limit the scope and define the boundaries of this 
thesis by describing alternative theoretical perspectives that could have been adopted.  
 
A realistic approach would be an obvious choice, were my aim to analyze possible political power 
struggles in the accession process itself, in which member states might have economic or political 
reasons for stalling the process. Instead, I focus on other possible reasons, namely the possibility 
that differences in culture and identities could be reasons for the stalemate in the negotiations. 
When researching matters of Turkey and the EU, one quickly realizes that the struggle over power 
is a frequent topic of discussion. In the realm of international politics, a fine line exits between 
coorporation, protecting self-interest and maintaining peace. For a realist, the approach taken is 
often referred to as a pessimistic approach. Realists tend to take the position of worst case-
scenario.50 
In the theory of realism, each individual state is the main actor in the international system. The 
theory argues that it is impossible for states, thinking states will always protect self-interest, to co-	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operate on a supra-national level. It is through this power struggle and the knowledge of military 
equality between distributors of power that realists see the only way of insuring peace.51  
A valid point and threat to the EU’s constellation is the belief among realists such as John J. 
Mearsheimer that extreme nationalism will once more gain substantial influence. In realism, as 
explained, states and nations are acting on their own accord. This is also an argument, which is used 
when discussing the possibility of extreme nationalism growing in force. The argument is that 
nations or nation states within the EU will find other nations threating and will have to act upon that 
threat. The fear being that this act will be of a violent nature to protect national interest.52 
Critics of realism would say that the EU is in it self a great power on the international political 
scene, and that states have found a way to collaborate on a supra-national level, and have done so 
successfully since the II World War. 53  This is also why I have chosen not to use realism as a 
theoretical approach in this thesis, since it fails to provide solid arguments of the still continuing 
integration of the European Union. Furthermore I have not chosen to implement realistic 
approaches because it does not reflect the scope of this thesis. I do not as mentioned focus on 
specific power political technicalities in the possible accession of Turkey. In stead I focus on the 
soft power elements, because I believe this to be essential in the field of research behind EU and 
Turkey relations. That members of the EU willingly are letting go of sovereignty are arguably a 
puzzle for most realists. This might help explain why few, other than Mearsheimer, have tried to 
make use of the theory when trying to explain EU matters.  
 
Steven J. Mock argues for a theoretical model in “Symbols of defeat in the Construction of National 
Identity” where he via empirical data demonstrates how “the nation state can fill the function in the 
modern world that religion did in pre-modern times.”54 Thus remembering that there are countries 
and nations where religion or a “transcendent father figure” ensures order in society.55 Mock is as 
mentioned also concerned with the formation of nations. With his model we are to understand how 
violence, despite being something we wish to expel from our society, becomes essential for the 
social order and establishment of nations. 56 Mock wants to show how nations have gathered after 	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religion or an all-ruling father figure is no longer present. He argues then that we through our 
shared memories of generative sacrifices can channel violence so that it will benefit society, thus 
the nation will function as a moral compass and be the law and justice of society.57 
I think it is an interesting theory, and I do arguably find his theory applicable on a more specific 
number of countries where it can be shown that religion through generations have played a 
consistently smaller part in the public sphere. In this thesis we are dealing with the entire European 
Union where religion is still very visible in the debate and public sphere, and we are also dealing 
with Turkey where it is arguably even more so.  
3.2 Ethno-symbolism 
The theory, I have chosen as a main support in the analysis, is Ethno-symbolism. In the scope of 
this thesis it will be used as described by Anthony D. Smith.58 The theory was written as a critical 
response to the theory of modernism, which focuses on the elite and how nations and collective 
identities are a creation of more present times. It was quite the distinguished academics Anthony D. 
Smith differed with; he was himself a former student of scholar Ernest Gellner and in the line of 
other great academics such as Elie Kedourie and Kenneth Minogue.59 The modernists as Anthony 
D. Smith refers to, see the time of the French revolution in 1789 and the elites from revolutions 
such as the French, as founders of nations and nationalism.60  
Ethno-symbolism explains contrary to modernism the importance of cultural elements over time. 
For Anthony D. Smith it is essential that national and collective identities be related to past ethnic 
ties.61 Only through observation of how these elements evolve and continue to play a role over la 
longe durée are we able to analyze social structures.62 Ethno-symbolism is first and foremost a 
theory of nation building and collective identity formation. It is not a static process but one where 
generations and nations change and develop through time. Thus an identity is a complex matter of 
past values, symbols and memories, that generation after generation will add to and contribute with 
own cultural elements.  
John A. Armstrong introduced Smith to the idea of studying nations and nationalism over la longue 
durée, which led to a further quest in researching how and why nations and identities form. A 	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highly important matter for Smith was to discover the origins of nations, and through this to better 
understand nations and collective identities today. 63  
As mentioned earlier identity formation is key to this thesis, in finding out why Turkey and the EU 
are struggling with finding enough common ground to make the membership a reality.  
Smith gives us two types of patterns that can help outline the formation of nations, the “lateral” and 
the “vertical”.64 The lateral being ethnic communities counting for the elites, explaining that a 
community was tied to their status as a superior class. The other being vertical, and the one I’m 
focusing on, forms nations through historical culture that unite despite classes, and where the 
elements of traditions and heritage plays a decisive role. Building and sustaining a nation, Smith 
explains, is very much linked to the persistence of the ethnic characters,65 when set out from a 
vertical ethnic community and the route Smith calls “Vernacular mobilization” organized religion, 
myths, sacred texts and documents insured that the traditions of the community survived. 66 Smith 
defines a nation as follows:  
“A nation is named human population sharing a historic territory common myth and historical 
memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all 
members”67  
In the following analysis chapter, I am using this approach to define the common ethnic 
characteristics of the EU on the one side and of Turkey on the other. This way, my aim is to 
examine whether EU and Turkey have a mutual ground or if they have differences that can help 
explain some of the difficulties in the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU.  
Ethno-symbolism have like most other theories been presented with areas of critic. In “Symbols of 
defeat in the Construction of National Identity” by Steven J. Mock he criticizes Smith’s theory of 
Ethno-symbolism for being inaccurate. Smith argues for the persistence and authenticity in 
symbols, myths and values from the past. Mock on the other hand argues that it is difficult to find 
any such authenticity in the existing nations or ethnic communities becoming nations. He argues 
that new groups or generations always will find themselves in contrast to the past generations, 
trying to win over the ethnic identity.68 Mock does agree with the importance of a community’s 
perception of authenticity specifically in symbols. In his opinion especially symbols of defeat are 
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easily accepted as authentic national signifiers.69  
3.3 Constructivism  
According to realism, anarchy and power between states enables war, but more importantly 
maintains peace. Looking at another theory in the field of international relations, we find 
Constructivism. The idea of Constructivism and the theory’s main purpose to demonstrate how 
elements of international relations are socially constructed was being noticed in the beginning of the 
1990’s. Alexander Wendt is recognised as the author behind the writings that put Constructivism 
and the sociological characters of this theory on the map.70 
In the analysis Constructivism is used primarily to examine the effects and constructs of social 
discourse and interaction, and to investigate the effects that social discourse and interaction can 
have on how identities develop. In the theory of Constructivism it is explained that collective 
identities can be build when power relations between countries are approached in a “non-egotistic” 
manner, without having aggressive national intentions at heart, but the ideal of peaceful 
collaboration.71  
A main trait of Constructivism is explained, like realism, by how we in society always strive to 
maintain peace. In the Constructivist theory peace is ensured through social interaction, human’s 
will to change, and not in the force or capacity of military power. These changes of norms and 
social practises occur as a result of history and how humans learn through social interaction and 
past events. Changes in societies are often a very slow process. In the European Union the social 
world, norms and values changed after the world wars because it was crucial for security.72  
4. Analysis and discussion 
4.1 European Identity 
The idea of a common European identity might for some seem unlikely, knowing the number of 
membership countries to be 28, some of them already dealing with several nations and identities 
trying to get along with one another. Nation is in this thesis understood as explained by Anthony D. 	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Smith, quoted in the theoretical chapter. In the following, I discuss the possibility of a shared 
European identity, especially when this identity is seen in the light of another identity in this case 
(the investigation of) a Turkish identity.  
Whether or not a European identity exists has been argued many times. Some say it is a work in 
progress, whilst others are sceptic or simply disagree. Though I believe it important to always 
remain sceptic, put in other words: to be open to new arguments and theories, and to the idea that 
there is no absolute truth, I find that there are strong arguments pointing towards it being possible to 
speak of a common European identity.  
Joining the discussion on identity, I find it important to initiate with a personal note, being that I 
believe identity is a matter of choice, context and culture. Individuals or groups do not necessarily 
only posses one identity, but are arguably able to have different identities a long side each other. It 
is a matter of choice in different settings and contexts: It can be argued that a specific group or 
individual might identify more with local culture, in the event or context of he or she finding 
themselves faced with new and different local traditions and values. Or if a European citizen were 
outside of Europe, the sense of belonging to a European identity might intensify.  
 
In the literature review, I mention Zygmunt Bauman who shares his thought on European identity 
as reality, because of the willingness in the EU to pursue or always try to obtain the same basic 
values.73 Scholars, who discuss and argue for a European identity, often mention values. As Smiths 
writes, “A nation is sharing of historical memories, public and mass culture”. This combined with 
Zygmunt Bauman’s argument of the “essences” or “spirit” of Europe, explained as our European 
consciousness developed through time by our shared memories and events,74 I see many 
reasoning’s behind a European identity.  
There is a definite sharing of public and mass culture in the EU. An example of this is the freedom 
of movement and services. Because of these freedoms, culture is exchanged and shared on a regular 
basis. Furthermore, all member countries have common legal rights and duties because of the EU’s 
achievement of the joint democratic collaboration. Being willing to make sacrifices for the 
community or nation is a feature often mentioned in terms of describing how identities are formed. 
Loyalty and trust is argued as a key to create a strong bond and preservation of the feeling of 
kinship.  
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The EU membership countries and European citizens have common memories, myths, symbols and 
future goals that arguably are a key to the formation or feeling of a common identity. Here, I want 
to emphasise common memories such as past catastrophic wars, especially World War II, which 
with its destructive and devastating result, led to the fellowship of war “never again” in Europe.75 
Symbols such as the European flag, a “national” anthem (“The European Anthem”), and arguably 
the Euro have still not proven as effective or unifying as some pro-European integrationist had 
hoped for, but the effect of especially the Euro have arguably created a closer bond or feeling of 
cohesion between the European citizens.76 
This development or creation of European identity can be seen as a result of Anthony D. Smith’s 
theory of ethno-symbolism and the constant development and changes in nations and identities 
through time with generation after generation having contributed and fought against competing 
identities. Keeping in mind that there are still many different cultures, values and norms within the 
EU, the development through time has arguably united through values, which the majority in 
Europe share and believe in, such as individual freedom, human rights and democracy.77 
Who are we? Who are we against? How is identity defined? As the second of the three questions 
imply, it is often defined through comparing one self or the group to “the other”, not much else can 
gather a human population like a common enemy can. The interesting question is if this image of a 
potential enemy or threat to the nation is sometimes exaggerated, or if it stems from prejudice build 
over a long period of time.  
A lot of dispute exits over the issue of religion in the discourse concerning a common European 
identity. For those who believe that the unifying aspects of the EU lie in the secular and democratic 
values, religion has little importance. Others believe that religion, in particular Christianity, is a 
corner stone of the EU and an important value, as they see religion as a source of traditions and 
values in many European societies. The question of religion has been and is still creating heated 
debates. The discussion of secular vs. Christian as a foundation for the EU is sensitive and full of 
conflicts. In the light of Ethno-symbolism and the theory’s core of ethnicities persisting and 
developing through time if important enough for the particular nation, it is argued in this thesis that 
Christianity is one of the ethnic myths and traditions that has prevailed. The meaning and argued 
importance has changed as generations have contributed their thoughts and ideas on the matter, and 
the religion has adapted to the secular principals of European society.  The values of secularization 	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are for many the corner stones of the European Union, and because of Europe’s brutal history 
caused by religious meddling in political matters, secularization was a path of reason, tolerance and 
individuality.  
4.2 Turkish Identity  
With this section, my aim is to outline and explain the development of national identity in Turkey, 
using Anthony D. Smith’s theory of identity formation. My purpose is to indicate whether or not the 
current identity is building on ethnic features such as symbols, myth, culture and values. This is 
provided with the same intentions as the above-mentioned section on European identity to ensure 
the reader with a substantial contextual understanding and to support the following analysis.  
The Ottoman Empire officially came to an end when the Lausanne-treaty was signed in July 1923. 
The signing of this treaty marked the end of a Turkish sultanate leading a multi-national empire and 
the beginning of an independent Turkish nation and republic.78 During World War I the Ottoman 
Empire was defeated and enemies succeeded in conquering large areas of the Empire, but the 
geographical land we know, as Turkey today was successfully kept safe by General Kemal Atatürk, 
who more than anything wanted to create a homogeneous Turkish nation. The methods and ways of 
achieving this nation of Turks led to violent and aggressive repressions of minorities. 79  Despite the 
majority of the Turkish people being religious with Islam as the main religion, Atatürk firmly 
believed that religion was to blame for the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and, inspired by the French 
revolution, that a modern nation and society had to be build on secular principals. Because his 
inspiration especially came from the French revolution, Atatürk’s idea of a secular state was total 
separation of state and church.80 He closed the Caliphate in 1924, and in 1928 he eliminated all 
influence Islam had on any state business. This very though secular ideology, known as the 
Kemalist ideology, was written into the Turkish constitution a year before his death in 1937.81 The 
ideology still creates heated debate among Turkish citizens, especially among the secular Turkish 
elite, constantly debating how strict the separation of church and state has to be in present day 
Turkey. 
The current cultural, social and political situation is quite different from when Atatürk was in 
power. The form of government is now a parliamentary democracy, lead by Recep Tayip Erdogan 	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and his Party, AKP, which has Islamic roots, though the party deny being Islamic-oriented.82 
Erdogan has been prime minister in Turkey since AKP’s big win general elections in 2002, and it is 
argued that visibility of religion has been growing in the Turkish public sphere under his leadership. 
This has been welcomed by the majority of the Turkish population, who despite continuing to 
treasure Atatürk, arguably identify themselves with their cultural heritage such as religious myths 
and traditions. The more secularly orientated part of Turks is more concerned with this development 
since some believe that religion is a threat to the nation, and that straying away from the strict 
separation of religion and state could lead to Turkey once more becoming a multi-cultural nation, 
such as in the time of the Ottoman Empire.  
The Turkish military have more than once forcefully removed democratically elected governments 
that threatened the principals of Atatürk’s vision for the nation. They are seen and see them selves 
as the protectors of the Kemalist ideology.83 In order to meet the criteria for membership asked by 
the EU, the power of the military has been diminished. The cultural and historical development of 
the Turkish nation have arguably contributed to the formation of a Turkish collective identity with 
democratic norms as foundation, as well as an identity with strong ties to its history of cultural and 
ethnic roots such as religious traditions, myths and values. The latter development continuing to 
establish it self and become more and more visible in Turkish society. 
Omer Taspinar argued at the lecture he held in Copenhagen that there was a need for change among 
the Turkish citizens, one of the reasons being that Kemalists are unable to provide stability and 
visibility in society.  
The reforms and changes made in Turkey were truly kicked off in the hope of fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria; this process arguably affected the political as well as the cultural world in 
Turkey.84 I mentioned the spill-over effect in the literature review, and I argue that from the time 
Turkey received status as candidate country, a politically and cultural spill-over process was also 
initiated. It is my personal opinion that this process has been rewarding to both the EU and Turkey, 
in terms of a closer relation both politically and culturally. An example of the democratic 
improvements in Turkey is the enhanced protection or focus on minorities.85 The main reason the 
EU was established in the first place, was to insure close ties between countries and nations in order 
to avoid war.  	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Through this investigation of the Turkish identity I want to find or examine any differences when 
compared to the proposed collective European identity in the analysis.  
4.3 Discussion of the identities  
Looking at Turkish identity today, I would argue that the development or formation can be 
explained or at least has to do with the country’s history and of the way secularism, liberalism and 
democracy were enforced on the Turkish population. The large Islamic population in Turkey 
eventually had to oppose the centralizing policies and created an identity around protecting their 
right to practice their religion alongside the political republic. The European identity also builds on 
secular and democratic values, but compared to Turkey these were enforced from the bottom up 
through revolutions instead of top-down like in Turkey. Despite this difference the European 
identity is still associated with and arguably has a strong bond to the Christian traditions and 
historical memories. The need for or unwillingness to give up on the Islamic or Christian cultural 
identity could indicate that nations, looking at it from the ethno-symbolisms prospective, are bound 
and closely connected to their important historical, cultural and ethnical roots.   
In the interview questions I asked Daniella Kuzmanovic for her opinion on main issues behind EU’s 
hesitation to accept Turkey into the EU. I would like to pay attention to the following quote: 
“One (issue), as has particularly been the case with France under Sarkozy but which is a current in 
most EU member states particularly among right-wing, nationalist parties, has to do with a notion 
of Turkey as not European or not European enough for cultural as well as religious reasons. This is 
what I would call the value argument.”86 
The difficulties or differences in the ethnic and historical past of Turkey and the EU arguably are an 
issue when it comes to the possible accession. As Daniella Kuzmanovic says, there is a doubt if 
Turkey is “European enough”.  
I have mentioned that an important aspect of identity formation is common historical memories. In 
“Identitet og identitetspolitik” Uffe Østergård argues that Turkey and the EU do have a common 
history and common memories, but compared to the memories shared in Europe that brought 
togetherness, the memories shared between Turkey and the EU have arguably become more of a 
symbol of the “other”.87 This heritage or past, looking at the discussion so far, is still to this day 
affecting opinion among Europeans. 	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I would like to focus on another quote from Daniella Kuzmanovic, because she also touches upon 
the differences that affect the opinion of Turkey in the EU. Besides the historical past, she 
emphasise that the possible and important bridge between the two will be difficult to achieve 
because of the religious and cultural differences being used as a hindrance.  
“The muslimness of Turkey is here used to create one kind of unbridgeable difference between 
Turkey and Europe, just as the lack of democracy, rights, and rule of law is highlighted as a sign of 
Turkey’s inability to develop what these actors perceive as inherent European values. In the eyes of 
proponents of such argument should Turkey become member it would challenge the whole notion of 
a European common community.”88 
4.4 Analysis of the speeches 
4.4.1 State of the Union 2013  
Topics: Semantic macrostructures 
I begin the Critical Discourse Analysis by summarizing the text; this is accomplished by listing 
important topics from the text. The aim for this is to find the semantic macrostructures, which are 
derived from the local structures of meaning. As explained in the chapter concerning method the 
topics embody the most important information of a discourse and represent what the discourse is 
about. They define what speakers, organizations and groups orient towards. They are often 
expressed in titles, headlines, summaries, abstracts, thematic sentences and conclusions.  
In Barroso’s “State of the Union address 2013” on September 11, 2013, the title does not express 
any topics, but it does express the self-categorization of the text genre: It is an address about the 
state that the EU is currently in.  
 
I have chosen the following topics summarizing the macropropositions: 
M1  The upcoming European Parliament elections give EU-politicians a responsibility to 
defend and explain the actions of the EU to the citizens.  
M2 The financial crisis erupted in spite of the EU collaboration, not because of it.  
M3  At this point in time after the crisis, EU is doing better than expected 
M4 Because the member states stood together, the crisis strengthened the collaboration 	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M5  Citizens of the EU member states do not know the facts about the EU’s positive role 
in solving the problems, because EU politicians do not allow themselves to be proud of it, and 
because the public debate is polluted by myths, populism, and extremism.  
M6 The biggest risk is if politicians show lack of commitment to stability and reforms 
M7  The idea of Europe needs to go far beyond the economy. It is about values and 
standards which only the EU level can protect to promote citizens individual rights such as 
consumer protection, labour rights, women’s rights, respect for minorities among many others.  
M8  The enlargement has been a success in healing history’s deep scars and establishing 
democracies.  
M9 EU cannot turn its back on countries like Ukraine (countries in the Eastern 
Partnership) which are seeking closer ties to the European Union, no matter the attempts to limit 
these countries of their sovereign choices.  
M10 It is only because they were offered the possibility of EU membership that Serbia and 
Kosovo have come to an agreement.  
M11 The EU was made to safeguard its values such as the rule of law, from the inception to 
the latest chapters in enlargement. 
 
In a further reduction I summarize these macropropositions to an overall macropropostion (topic):  
In upcoming EU elections, EU politicians must clarify to the unknowing voters that the EU is not 
causing the economical problems, but solving them, and that the ongoing EU enlargement is about 
ensuring peace by establishing democracy and safeguarding democratic values like rule of law.  
 
Local meanings 
In this section I analyze local meanings with focus on the meaning of the words in the text. 
Knowing the limitation of pages and in order to probably investigate the scope of this thesis, a more 
specific analysis of a few carefully selected local meanings is in focus.  
At this local semantic level, I examine the use of the words “Europe” and “European” which has 
implications that express the ideological perspective of the author/speaker, Barroso. From the 
beginning of the text, it becomes clear that Barroso is not only using “Europe” as a name for the 
continent and not only using “European” about citizens of the ethnic groups in Europe.   
In the very first sentence after the initial greetings, “Europe” is used in a way, which can be seen as 
a synonym of the EU. Hence talking about the upcoming elections for the European Parliament, 
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Barroso says that “…voters across Europe will…”.89 In the following sentences, he talks about 
“Europe” as something that has been present in the lives of citizens and discussed in talk shows.  
 
In the following paragraph, he presents a theme for the address: His “main ideas for a truly 
European political debate ahead of next year’s elections”.90 The fact that he talks about a “truly 
European” debate implies that “European” might be an ideological concept to him.  
This is emphasized even more when he says: “…our European model strengthens the trust of the 
citizens…”91 
 
In the speech, Barroso quickly starts associating “Europe” with the words “we” and “together”. 
This further implies that he is using “Europe” as a synonym for the EU or the EU member states. It 
becomes even more evident when he says “together, as the European Union, we can…”.92  
 
Later he says: “Now is the time for all of those who care about Europe, whatever their political or 
ideological position, (…) to speak up for Europe”.93 This implies that he is not only talking about 
Europe as a synonym for the EU, but as something you can care for and speak up for.  
 
That “Europe” and “European” is also established as an ideological concept in the mental model is 
argued through two paragraphs in which Barroso talks about “our idea of Europe” and “The 
European ideal”.94 He explicitly outlines this in the following sentences in which he underlines that 
it “is about values” and that it is about believing in “political, social and economic standards” 
which are grounding in “our social market economy”.  
 
“Europe and “European” is throughout the speech associated with positive words which shows a 
form of positive self-presentation. As an example, it is mentioned that Serbia and Kosovo have 
come to an agreement “only because they were offered a European perspective”.95 In the following 
sentence a Nobel Prize winner is quoted saying that “Europe is a project of peace”. And later, 
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“European” is associated with “responsibility” and “solidarity” – both of which are concepts 
related to prevailing ideologies in most European countries.  
Using “Europe” and “European” instead of “EU” might influence the mental model of the 
recipients being constructed here. It is implied that the ideological concept which it is associated 
with, is not only a product of compromises between politicians, but values which is firmly anchored 
in a common culture shared among the nations of the continent. And that the EU therefore can 
speak with one voice on behalf of a united people: “In Europe, we believe…”.96   
 
Another expression that emphasizes the ideological or common heritage of “Europe” is indicated 
when Barroso says “Surely you all know Justus Lipsius”.97 Referring to him because he was an 
influential scholar and has given name to the Council building in Brussels, it indicates a symbol of 
our shared history and common values such as rationality and reason.  
 
The choice of the concept of “Europe” and “European” influences other local meanings in the rest 
of the text. This is emphasized by the lexical selection of words when referring to opponents of the 
ideological concept of Europe presented in this speech. “Let me say this to all those who rejoice in 
Europe's difficulties and who want to roll back our integration and go back to isolation: the pre-
integrated Europe of the divisions, the war, the trenches, is not what people desire and deserve.”98 
The first part implies the ideological presupposition that difficulties of some (Europe, meaning the 
EU) are the cause for rejoicing among its opponents. In other words, whilst Europe is a project for 
common good – a premise outlined in the previous paragraphs – opponents are finding joy in other 
people’s misery. This polarization of the mental model is further enforced when Barroso associates 
rolling back the EU integration with negative words like “isolation” and “war”. This way he 
defines the aim of opponents of EU integration in negative terms, and at the same time implies the 
ideological presupposition that the only alternative to the EU is going back to the time of war in 
Europe.  
The local meaning thus implies a contrast between the moral of the proponents and of the 
opponents of the EU, which indicate a form of negative other presentation. Arguably this polarizes 
the mental model of the recipients in the sense that while the intentions of the EU and of its 
proponents are for the common good, the intentions of its opponents are bad. 	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Throughout the text many expressions also have the ideological presupposition that national 
interests are standing in the way of common success for Europe. As an example, it is outlined that 
“real progress for Europe” can only be achieved if countries “rise above purely national issues”.99   
Finally, among many other local meanings of this text, I mention the importance of what is being 
left out in the text. In talking about the enlargement and positive consequences of it, Barroso only 
mentions some countries – namely Serbia and “countries like Ukraine”.100  
The expression “countries like Ukraine” is in the same paragraph associated with the “Eastern 
Partnership” which is a partnership between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, 
Ukraine, and the EU.  
This means that candidate countries like Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey are omitted in the 
text. Talking about omission is only relevant in a discourse when it can be shown that the omitted 
information is part of the mental model. One could argue that it is striking that an explicit reference 
to Turkey is left out in the text, because several topics of the speech seem to relate directly to 
developments in the Turkish accession process, some of which was happening just prior to the 
address.  
Issues, which particularly could imply an implicit relation to the Turkish accession process are 
Barroso’s descriptions of the values which EU is protecting by requiring a country to “establish 
democracies” if it wants to be taken in to consideration as a possible EU member. Furthermore 
when he says, “Safeguarding its values, such as the rule of law, is what the European Union was 
made to do, from its inception to the latest chapters in enlargement.”101 The emphasis of the 
specific value “rule of law” can also be referred to problems in member states like the Roma crisis 
in France in the summer of 2010, the Hungarian crisis that started at the end of 2011; or the 
Romanian rule of law crisis in the summer of 2012. But in this case, Barroso is emphasizing rule of 
law in the context of enlargement, and considering the date of the speech it seems strikingly 
relevant to the events in Turkey. Two months prior to Barroso’s address, the EU strongly criticized 
problems concerning rule of law in Turkey in relation to the Turkish government’s crackdown on 
protesters in Gezi Park in Istanbul. Just one month after the address, the EU published a progress 
report about Turkey’s accession in which the government’s reaction to the protests and the lack of 
judicial response to claimed police brutality are mentioned as a crucial problem in the first chapter: 
“Democracy and the rule of law”.  	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4.4.2 AKP group meeting  
Topics: Semantic macrostructures 
Like the previous analysis of Barroso’s speech, I begin by summarizing the text, listing important 
topics to find the semantic macrostructures, derived from local structures of meaning.  
In Erdogan’s “AK Party Group Meeting” speech on June 25, 2013, the title does not express topics 
or categorization of the text genre. It does though express the setting or context, namely the party 
group meeting. 
 
I have chosen following topics summarizing the macropropositions: 
M1 The politics of the AKP are helping Turkey by providing better education and 
enhancing Turkey’s international reputation. 
M2 The organizers behind recent protests have been searching for outside support because 
they knew that the Turkish people, who are now showing support for the AKP government at its 
rallies, wouldn’t fall for their disinformation about the AKP 
M3 Some protesters are sincere in their aim to protect trees, but others are insincere 
because they demand that the AKP government must step down which is against the will of the 
nation.  
M4 The AKP government has always listened to all groups in society and all 76 million 
citizens of Turkey, but it will fight those who go against the will of the nation. 
M5 Protests are attempts to weaken the new, powerful Turkey that has been created by 
10.5 years of AKP government, because the opposition parties can’t win by using democratic 
means and want to disguise their responsibility for wrongdoings against groups of its own 
electorate.  
M6 Like protests in Brazil, the current protests in Turkey have been started by the foreign 
interest rate lobby which is unhappy that the new economic stability has caused the Turkish interest 
rate to drop.  
M7 The AKP government is solving all problems within the boundaries of democracy and 
rule of law, while the protesters have illegally tried a military coup.  
M8 By being part of the conspiracy against the AKP government and thereby Turkey, 
international media have contributed in making violent protesters look peaceful and make the police 
look like it was using excessive force against them.  
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M9 Gezi Park had to be cleared of protesters because the park belongs to our people. 
M10 The protesters have insulted the AKP electorate with accessions of voting fraud and 
also insulted sacred Islamic values.  
M11 Unnatural connections between the CHP and European countries show that they are 
collaborating in starting conflicts in Turkey.  
M12 Investments leaving Turkey only do so because of global tendencies, not because of 
the protests or the government. 
 
I make a further reduction by summarizing the above-mentioned macropropositions with the 
following overall macropropostion (topic):  
Recent protests against the AKP government do not have the support of the Turkish people, but are 
organized by an international conspiracy to destroy the progress Turkey has made in the last 10 
years. This is done by luring the world into believing that the AKP government is using 
undemocratic means against peaceful protesters when it is in fact enforcing the will of the nation 
upon violent protesters. 
 
Local meanings 
I begin by examining the use of the expressions “will of nation” and “the nation’s will” which 
have implications that express the ideological perspective of the author/speaker, Erdogan.  
The first time these expressions are used in the text, is in mentioning that the AKP is organizing 
rallies called “Respect for Will of Nation”.102  
The use of this expression as part of a rally title and maybe even as a party slogan strongly implies a 
form of positive self-presentation – understood as the AKP respecting what the nation wants. 
Furthermore this also implies the proposition that people who criticize the AKP do not have respect 
for the nation’s will – here seen in the form of negative other presentation. The use of the 
expression as part of a title or slogan implies an effort to create a mental model of the recipients, 
which far exceeds this speech.  
From here on, Erdogan uses the expression “will of the nation” not as a title or a slogan, but as a 
concept, which he constantly associates with the actions of the AKP. The actions of his government 
are hereby defined in positive terms, implying a form of legal and moral right.  
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“Among the protestors there are some who aim to attack the government and the will of nation 
rather than using their democratic rights for innocent and righteous demands.”103 
 
This sentence also expresses the ideological presupposition that attacking the government and 
thereby the will of nation is the opposite of using democratic rights for righteous demands.             
It is also worth noting that some of the lexical choices here create polarization between the 
government and the protesters. Among many examples are the use of the word “attack” which 
associates the protesters with brutality and lack of democratic legitimacy.  
This is also emphasized two paragraphs prior to this, when Erdogan associates the protesters with 
violence and his own government with democracy and law. 
“Violence, tension, and conflict would definitely not help in solving the problems. We will solve our 
problems by talking and within the confines of democracy and law.”104 
 
Erdogan is omitting the fact that both the EU and human rights organizations like Amnesty 
International strongly criticized his government for using violent force against what started as 
peaceful protest.  
Later in the same paragraph, Erdogan continues associating AKP with the will of the nation: 
“As long as we have our people’s support, we would never back down from serving our people and 
representing the will of nation.”105 
This sentence expresses the presupposition that the AKP has the people’s support – a premise that is 
explicitly established in the beginning of the text when Erdogan states that, “last week we received 
the intense affection of the people”.106 
By expressing a promise to never back down from representing the will of nation, the sentence also 
has a presupposition that the AKP is in fact representing the will of nation now.  
Relevant to the analysis of “will of nation” is the repeated use of the phrase “our people” 
throughout the speech. Talking about the “Respect for will of nation”-rallies, uses the expression 
“our people” about citizens who are supporting the AKP: 
“All these rallies have reflected very clearly how our people react to the recent protests and acts of 
violence in Turkey. Our people patiently watched those protests but that same wisdom also enabled 
them to see the big picture.”107 	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At this point it is unclear if “our people” refers to the Turkish nation as a whole or only to 
Erdogan’s own supporters. One could easily come to the conclusion that he is referring to the nation 
as a whole, but that would be a mistake due to the fact that Erdogan is omitting to mention that 
millions of Turkish citizens participated in the protests and many more expressed agreement with 
their criticism.  
This omission is further clarified looking at the first part of the speech where Erdogan notes that the 
People’s Republican Party, the CHP, has been organizing and provoking the protests. The CHP 
received 26 percent of the votes at the 2011 general election, thereby representing more than 11 
million Turkish voters.108Therefore, when Erdogan is talking about “our people” in these 
sentences, and omits to mention that this is his supporters and not the nation as a whole, he is 
constructing a mental model for the recipients in which it seems as if he is acting on behalf of 
almost every Turkish citizen against a small group of evildoers.  
 
Further on in the speech, Erdogan associates both “our people” and “the will of nation” with the 
government and specific values.  
“They (the protesters) insulted our sacred values such as headscarf, mosques, and flag. We cannot 
tolerate such behavior. So when the election time comes our people will reveal their judgment on 
these vandals and looters for what they tried to do to the will of nation”109 
In these sentences, Erdogan explicitly refers to headscarf, mosques, and flag as “our sacred values”. 
The lexical choice of the word “sacred” implies that these values are part of a domain, which must 
not be questioned or criticized. In labeling these values as “sacred”, it is implied that they are 
anchored in a common culture. This is one of many examples implying that Erdogan has adopted an 
ideology that does not allow even large minority groups in society to express, to criticize or 
demonstrate against values or opinions of the majority.  
When Erdogan talks of judgment for what the protesters tried to do to the will of the nation, it 
shows that he is setting up the specific mental model in this speech based on this general ideology.  
Using hyperboles like “vandals” and “looters” about the protesters, Erdogan further implements 
the conceptual polarization between legitimate government and illegitimate protesters mentioned 
earlier.  
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At the end of the speech, it is emphasized that Erdogan is creating a mental model based on the 
before mentioned general ideology that minorities must not criticize the will of the majority.  
In the beginning of the paragraph below he expresses support for a version of democracy, which is 
the prevailing ideal of modern, Western European countries:  
“We have always been the Government of our entire 76 million citizens even though we have only 
received 50 percent of the votes (…) It is important to note that we are building a Turkey where our 
differences make us richer and stronger and everyone’s lifestyle is well respected. We have never 
discriminated among our citizens..”110 
But in the end of that same paragraph another sentence is important to mention because it can be 
seen as a firm contradiction of this ideal: 
“We will face those who attacked our nation’s will, democracy, and economy in the next elections.” 
On one hand, Erdogan reassures the recipients that his government is respecting the other 50 
percent of the voters who do not vote for his party. Immediately thereafter he says that his party will 
“face those who attacked our nation’s will” – meaning the millions of protesters who is most likely 
among the 50 percent not voting for AKP.   
 
Finally, I examine the local meanings and their effects in the parts of the speech where Erdogan 
implies or explicitly say that an international conspiracy is behind the protest. The first time he 
implies this is when mentioning protests in Brazil: 
“I think the protests in Brazil have also been started by foreign perpetuators since Brazil has just 
paid off its debt to IMF just like we did. We said it was the interest rate lobby from the beginning 
that was unhappy for the headway we have made in economy.”111 
By using the expression “also” in the first sentence, he expresses the ideological presupposition 
that a foreign interest rate lobby started the protests in Turkey. This notion, that an international 
conspiracy is at play, becomes explicit later in the speech when Erdogan addresses the role of 
European countries, exchanging letters with the chairman of the Turkish opposition party CHP: 
“They are collaborating for starting a sectarian conflict in Turkey and this exchange of letters 
could not be a coincidence”,112 Erdogan says and continues by talking about “unnatural 
connections”.  
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The lexical selection of expressions in these past three quotes, like “perpetuators” implies the 
formation of a biased model of events where the actors who are opponents of “our people” and 
“will of nation” is not only bad, but also portrayed as criminals. The use of expressions like “not a 
coincidence”, and “unnatural connections” emphasizes the overall polarization of the conceptual 
structure of the text where the actions of his opponents are described as covert and dishonest.  
At the same time it implies that forces outside of Turkey – European countries, international media, 
and a foreign interest rate lobby all explicitly mentioned – is secretly and dishonestly seeking to go 
against the will of the Turkish nation by manipulating with facts and trying to provoke people to 
protest.  
Erdogan then mentions that a Turkish representative of an international media company tweeted 
and asked people to stop consuming to make the Turkish economy suffer in order to force the 
Government to listen them. To this Erdogan rhetorically asks: 
“How could someone betray his own country like this?”113 
This sentence has the ideological presupposition that it is downright treason if a Turkish person 
encourages his fellow countrymen to try to force the government to listen. This shows not only the 
ideological proposition that minorities should not criticize the majority, but also implies that 
Erdogan might see it as an un-Turkish action to criticize the majority or to encourage acts such as 
the mentioned consumer protests. An action that might even go against his ideological model of 
Turkish values.   
4.5 Discussion  
In the following I discuss the results from the analysis of the two speeches. This discussion is 
furthermore arguments for or against the scope of this thesis based on earlier findings and the 
theory of Constructivism, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter. 
In the two speeches both speakers are constructing mental models for the recipients, though 
available to the public, in both cases the main recipients are politicians. This is important to note 
because both speeches are held in front of publicly elected politicians, all capable of directly 
affective change. The results or the analysis show that both texts emphasise and connect common or 
shared values to positive notions, in a positive self-presentation being part of the mental models 
constructed for the recipients. They are arguably thereby able to affect opinion and attitudes.  
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Barroso constructs an image of the other by mentioning opponents of the EU. Based on the 
constructivist theory, this construction of the other through social discourse is important in forming 
a collective identity. As mentioned, Constructivism imply that collective identity is build around 
those who have a non-egotistic approach, and are arguably set aside from those with aggressive 
self-interest in terms of international relations.114 Then looking at the analysis of Erdogans speech 
there is clear indication that he is expressing a quite aggressive national self and arguably an 
unwillingness to look beyond “the will of the nation”. There are several occasions in the speech, as 
shown, where Erdogan positively enhances Turkeys situation and show little or no understanding 
for the protestors. “everything was going great in Turkey. So what is there to protest really?”115 
This indicates an unwillingness to look beyond the wants of the Turkish nation as Erdogan and his 
Party AKP have constructed it.    
The omission of positive expressions about Turkey in Barroso’ speech or about the EU in 
Erdogan’s speech could be seen as an indication of difficulties in the accession process. In 
Erdogan’s speech there is no indication or effort in a reconciliation following the events and 
protests. This could suggest a shift in attitude and that the wish to join the EU is steadily decreasing 
for the current government with Erdogan in charge. This is also emphasised in the fact Erdogan is 
omitting to mention or comment on the international criticism, concerning the acts and comments 
against the protests and protestors.  
The omission of Turkey in the State of the Union speech could suggest implicit distinction between 
“us” being the EU and Turkey not being a part of this “us”. This could indicate that Barroso in a 
very implicit way is communicating that Turkey is not yet ready to become part of the European 
identity. Here we can once more focus on the construction of collective identity, suggesting that the 
EU still sees Turkey as having an aggressive self-interest approach to international relations. Put 
into other words by Daniella Kuzmanovic in the following quote:  
“A bigger EU could more easily disintegrate and it will be more difficult to create unity among its 
members on the various issues pertaining to the EU – this is difficult enough as it is now!”116  
The fact that Erdogan very proudly speaks of the “intense support of his people” - understood in 
this thesis as the people who voted for him, and arguably excluding those who did not - is a clear 
difference between the EU and Turkey. Where the EU, through its social discourse, emphasizes the 	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protection of each individual through the rule of law, Erdogan is arguably using the analyzed 
discourse to protect the will of the nation, which as we have shown in the analysis means the will of 
his own government and the people who support it.  
 
In the previous discussion on identities it is suggested that the Turkish and the European identity, 
analysed through ethno-symbolism, have anchored connections to different cultural roots and 
histories. Following this line of thought I want to discuss other differences found in the analysis of 
the speeches. In the theory of Constructivism the role of shared ideas is an ideational structure 
constraining and shaping behaviour in a society.117 In the analysis of the two speeches I have found 
results that indicate a social discourse containing different expressions of socially shared ideas. An 
example of this difference is the way Erdogan uses the word democracy, and the way he continues 
to do so in the speech. With the results of the CDA analysis this use of democracy can be criticized 
as a “tyranny of the majority”. This is actually an accusation that has been made in several articles 
relating to how Erdogan is exercising his power as Prime Minister.118 So even though there have 
been improvements in the protection of minorities in Turkey, these results are suggested to be in 
stark contrast to the view on democracy that is prevailing in the EU, including individual rights and 
consideration for minorities which are main ideas and shared values portrayed in Barroso’s speech.  
I asked Professor Omer Taspinar what he believed to be reasons behind EU prolonging the 
accession process with Turkey. The following answer is inline with the above-mentioned 
suggestions that there is a significant difference in culture and identity between Turkey and the EU.  
“For the European right the main problem is Turkey's Islamic character. For the centrists it is 
Turkey's size and the fear of immigration and unemployment in Europe. For the left it is the fact 
that Turkey is not democratic and liberal enough.”119 
To further the discussion on found differences between Turkey and the EU in the speeches and to 
emphasize the first line of Omer Taspinar’s quote, I argue that there is a difference shown in the 
texts in terms of religious traditions.  
Even though I earlier argued that some common traditions and myths in Europe stem from a 
Christian heritage, this religious heritage take up little space in political discourse. Barroso does not 	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express any religious words or comments; he does on the other hand mention a symbol of the 
democratic cultural heritage of the EU. The mentioned “Justus Lipsius”, now the name of the 
council building in Brussels, the capital of political affaires in the EU, and an influential humanist 
from the 16th century. This symbol indicates close ties to the historical development of democracy 
and the rule of law in the EU. With this I argue that there is an issue in how Erdogan uses 
traditional and “sacred” values such as the headscarf and mosques, as part of a political speech on 
democracy. Furthermore it is arguably a problematic difference because there is a separation of 
religion and state in the EU, and even though the current Turkish society is also build on secular 
principals, I have suggested that there are signs of a different perspective on how much religion is a 
part of the agenda.  
Omer Taspinar develops this in following quote: “Islamophobia, the backlash against 
multiculturalism, the gender equality question are all relevant in the eyes of many Europeans.”120 
It is neither a personal opinion nor do I find it positive or productive for our societies, but the results 
are arguably indicating that these differences prevent the integration of Turkey into the EU.  
5. Conclusion  
The collective memories of aggressive national interest that led to the World Wars, created 
important and prevailing values in Europe. It has been proved that by surrendering parts of ones 
national sovereignty in exchange for a “friendly” political and supranational collaboration peace 
can be a gathering goal and preserved.  
This thesis has investigated why the EU has yet to recognize Turkey as a nation-state also willing to 
put aside self-interest in order to assure peace despite of differences.    
It is argued through the analysis and discussion of identities and culture that specific obstacles are 
still to overcome if Turkey is to become part of the EU. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the collective 
identity in Europe is built on the constant pursuit of shared basic values, such as democracy, 
rationality and justice. The findings of this analysis indicate that Turkey, still after all these years, 
will have difficulties adapting to this identity, suggesting that Turkey and the EU are in pursuit of 
different values.  
The internal battles on culture both in Turkey and the EU have not contributed in furthering the 
accession process. The demonstrations in Turkey, of which Erdogan spoke in the speech analysed 
in the above, showed evidence of many differences, one of them argued in this paper as a possible 	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different view on the meaning of democracy. The EU has been faced with internal discussions on 
the principals of the rule of law in the mentioned events where membership countries have been 
accused of disregarding some of the basic values constituting the collaboration. At the time of 
writing this conclusion, these conflicts are yet to be fully resolved, but one can hope that they are 
resolved with agreement and that this affects future conflicts of difference, maybe even the potential 
membership of Turkey. 
The conclusion, now knowing how persisting ethnic features, collective memories, historical and 
cultural developments influence identities, is that the EU arguably still signifies Turkey as “the 
other”, as a nation with a different and competing culture. Turkey as a nation is still in development 
following Atatürk. The cultural roots and religious majority are arguably claiming their place in the 
Turkish society.  It is seemingly not a first priority among many Turkish citizens to become a 
member of the EU, whether it is due to differences in culture or the dismissive behaviour of the EU. 
The findings in this thesis suggest that these are the reasons for Turkey’s long accession process. 
The implication of this is that no membership is currently in sight.  
5.1 Prospects  
It does look as if there is still a long wait before Turkey and the EU can open the last chapters in the 
accession process to membership. I want to stress that the mere process or the on-going accession 
talks, the efforts to achieve agreements through discussions and politics in a democratic 
atmosphere, is enabling or creating a rational and productive way for the two parties to preserve 
peace and insure growth. I would not want to see the accession process being put to a stop with the 
above-mentioned or other differences being at fault.  
Traditions, values and memories are important in our lives, but they can also be the cause of 
prejudice. It is important to learn from the past and there are certainly values worth treasuring, but it 
should not prevent an open mind to those who appear different. It is apparel to be aware of how we 
portray the “other”. We must ensure that these images of the “other” are not only negative or even 
dangerous.  
An obvious further study or future research on these findings, which could be interesting, is how we 
potentially solve the problems that come from the differences in our cultures and identities.  
The hope is that the conversations, social interaction and the accession negotiations will continue 
between Turkey and the EU. This would arguably make the risk of dangerous disagreements less 
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likely to occur. And this would once again prove the mission set out by the EU from the very 
beginning.   
"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the 
dangers which threaten it."121 
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Mr. President, 
Presidency of the Council, 
Honourable Members, 
Ladies and gentlemen, 
 
In 8 months' time, voters across Europe will judge what we have achieved together in the last 
5 years.  
In these 5 years, Europe has been more present in the lives of citizens than ever before. 
Europe has been discussed in the coffee houses and popular talk shows all over our continent.  
Today, I want to look at what we have done together. At what we have yet to do. And I want 
to present what I believe are the main ideas for a truly European political debate ahead of 
next year's elections.  
 
Honourable Members, 
   
As we speak, exactly 5 years ago, the United States government took over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, bailed out AIG, and Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. 
These events triggered the global financial crisis. It evolved into an unprecedented economic 
crisis. And it became a social crisis with dramatic consequences for many of our citizens. 
These events have aggravated the debt problem that still distresses our governments. They 
have led to an alarming increase in unemployment, especially amongst young people. And 
they are still holding back our households and our companies.  
But Europe has fought back. In those 5 years, we have given a determined response. We 
suffered the crisis together. We realised we had to fight it together. And we did, and we are 
doing it.  
If we look back and think about what we have done together to unite Europe throughout the 
crisis, I think it is fair to say that we would never have thought all of this possible 5 years ago.  
We are fundamentally reforming the financial sector so that people's savings are safe. 
We have improved the way governments work together, how they return to sound public 
finances and modernise their economies.  
We have mobilised over 700 billion euro to pull crisis-struck countries back from the brink, the 
biggest effort ever in stabilisation between countries.  
I still vividly remember my meeting last year with chief economists of many of our leading 
banks. Most of them were expecting Greece to leave the euro. All of them feared the 
disintegration of the euro area. Now, we can give a clear reply to those fears: no one has left 
or has been forced to leave the euro. This year, the European Union enlarged from 27 to 28 
member states. Next year the euro area will grow from 17 to 18.  
What matters now is what we make of this progress. Do we talk it up, or talk it down? Do we 
draw confidence from it to pursue what we have started, or do we belittle the results of our 
efforts? 
 
Honourable members,  
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I just came back from the G20 in Saint Petersburg. I can tell you: this year, contrary to recent 
years, we Europeans did not receive any lessons from other parts of the world on how to 
address the crisis. We received appreciation and encouragement. 
Not because the crisis is over, because it is not over. The resilience of our Union will continue 
to be tested. But what we are doing creates the confidence that we are overcoming the crisis 
– provided we are not complacent.  
We are tackling our challenges together. 
We have to tackle them together.  
In our world of geo-economic and geopolitical tectonic changes, I believe that only together, 
as the European Union, we can give our citizens what they aspire: that our values, our 
interests, our prosperity are protected and promoted in the age of globalisation.  
So now is the time to rise above purely national issues and parochial interests and to have 
real progress for Europe. To bring a truly European perspective to the debate with national 
constituencies.   
Now is the time for all those who care about Europe, whatever their political or ideological 
position, wherever they come from, to speak up for Europe. 
If we ourselves don't do it, we cannot expect others to do it either. 
 
Honourable Members, 
 
We have come a long way since the start of the crisis.  
In last year's State of the Union speech, I stated that 'despite all [our] efforts, our responses 
have not yet convinced citizens, markets or our international partners'. 
One year on, the facts tell us that our efforts have started to convince. Overall spreads are 
coming down. The most vulnerable countries are paying less to borrow. Industrial output is 
increasing. Market trust is returning. Stock markets are performing well. The business outlook 
is steadily improving. Consumer confidence is sharply rising.   
We see that the countries who are most vulnerable to the crisis and are now doing most to 
reform their economies, are starting to note positive results.  
In Spain, as a signal of the very important reforms and increased competitiveness, exports of 
goods and services now make up 33% of GDP, more than ever since the introduction of the 
euro. Ireland has been able to draw money from capital markets since the summer of 2012, 
the economy is expected to grow for a third consecutive year in 2013 and Irish manufacturing 
companies are re-hiring staff.  
In Portugal, the external current account, which was structurally negative, is now expected to 
be broadly balanced, and growth is picking up after many quarters in the red.  Greece has 
completed, just in 3 years, a truly remarkable fiscal adjustment, is regaining competitiveness 
and is nearing for the first time in decades a primary surplus. And Cyprus, that has started 
the programme later, is also implementing it as scheduled, which is the pre-condition for a 
return to growth. 
 
For Europe, recovery is within sight.  
Of course, we need to be vigilant. 'One swallow does not make a summer, nor one fine day'. 
Let us be realistic in the analysis. Let us not overestimate, but let's also not underestimate 
what has been done. Even one fine quarter doesn't mean we are out of the economic heavy 
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weather. But it does prove we are on the right track. On the basis of the figures and 
evolutions as we now see them, we have good reason to be confident.  
This should push us to keep up our efforts. We owe it to those for whom the recovery is not 
yet within reach, to those who do not yet profit from positive developments. We owe it to our 
26 million unemployed. Especially to the young people who are looking to us to give them 
hope. Hope and confidence are also part of the economic equation. 
 
Honourable members,  
 
If we are where we are today, it is because we have shown the resolve to adapt both our 
politics and our policies to the lessons drawn from the crisis. 
And when I say 'we', I really mean: 'we': it has really been a joint effort. 
At each and every step, you, the European Parliament, you have played a decisive role 
through one of the most impressive records of legislative work ever. I personally believe this 
is not sufficiently known by the citizens of Europe, and you deserve more credit and 
recognition for this. 
So let us continue to work together to reform our economies, for growth and jobs, and to 
adapt our institutional architecture. Only if we do so, we will leave this phase of the crisis 
behind us as well. 
There is a lot we can still deliver together, in this Parliament's and this Commission's 
mandate.  
What we can and must do, first and foremost, let's be concrete is delivering the banking 
union. It is the first and most urgent phase on the way to deepen our economic and monetary 
union, as mapped out in the Commission's Blueprint presented last autumn. 
The legislative process on the Single Supervisory Mechanism is almost completed. The next 
step is the ECBs independent valuation of banks assets, before it takes up its supervisory role.  
Our attention now must urgently turn to the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Commission's 
proposal is on the table since July and, together, we must do the necessary to have it adopted 
still during this term. 
It is the way to ensure that taxpayers are no longer the ones in the front line for paying the 
price of bank failure. It is the way to make progress in decoupling bank from sovereign risk. 
It is the way to remedy one of the most alarming and unacceptable results of the crisis: 
increased fragmentation of Europe's financial sector and credit markets - even an implicit re-
nationalisation. 
And it is also the way to help restoring normal lending to the economy, notably to SMEs. 
Because in spite of the accommodating monetary policy, credit is not yet sufficiently flowing to 
the economy across the euro area. This needs to be addressed resolutely.  
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Ultimately, this is about one thing: growth, which is necessary to remedy today’s most 
pressing problem: unemployment. The current level of unemployment is economically 
unsustainable, politically untenable, socially unacceptable. So all of us here in the Commission 
– and I'm happy to have all my Commissioners today here with me - all of us want to work 
intensively with you, and with the member states, to deliver as much of our growth agenda as 
we possibly can, we are mobilizing all instruments, but of course we have to be honest, not all 
are at European level, some are at national level. I want to focus on implementation of the 
decisions on youth employment and financing of the real economy. We need to avoid a jobless 
recovery. 
Europe therefore must speed up the pace of structural reforms. Our Country Specific 
Recommendations set out what the member states must do in this respect.  
At EU level - because there is what can be done at national level and what can be done at 
European level -, the focus should be on what matters most for the real economy: exploiting 
the full potential of the single market comes first.  
We have a well-functioning single market for goods, and we see the economic benefits of that. 
We need to extend the same formula to other areas: mobility, communications, energy, 
finance and e-commerce, to name but a few. We have to remove the obstacles that hold back 
dynamic companies and people. We have to complete connecting Europe. 
I'd like to announce that, today, we will formally adopt a proposal that gives a push towards a 
single market for telecoms. Citizens know that Europe has dramatically brought down their 
costs for roaming. Our proposal will strengthen guarantees and lower prices for consumers, 
and present new opportunities for companies. We know that in the future, trade will be more 
and more digital. Isn't it a paradox that we have an internal market for goods but when it 
comes to digital market we have 28 national markets? How can we grab all the opportunities 
of the future that are opened by the digital economy if we don't conclude this internal market? 
The same logic applies to the broader digital agenda: it solves real problems and improves 
daily life for citizens. The strength of Europe's future industrial base depends on how well 
people and businesses are interconnected. And by properly combining the digital agenda with 
data protection and the defence of privacy, our European model strengthens the trust of the 
citizens. Both with respect to internal and external developments, adopting the proposed 
legislation on data protection is of utmost importance to the European Commission. 
The single market is a key lever for competitiveness and employment. Adopting all remaining 
proposals under the Single Market Act I and II, and implementing the Connecting Europe 
Facility in the next few months, we lay the foundations for prosperity in the years to come. 
We are also adapting to a dynamic transformation on a global scale, so we must encourage 
this innovative dynamism at a European scale. That is why we must also invest more in 
innovation, in technology and the role of science. I have great faith in science, in the capacity 
of the human mind and a creative society to solve its problems. The world is changing 
dramatically. And I believe many of the solutions are going to come, in Europe and outside 
Europe, from new science studies, from new technologies. And I would like Europe to be 
leading that effort globally.  This is why we - Parliament and Commission - have made such a 
priority of Horizon 2020 in the discussions on the EU budget.  
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That is why we use the EU budget to invest in skills, education and vocational training, 
dynamising and supporting talent. That is why we have pushed for Erasmus Plus. 
And that is why, later this autumn, we will make further proposals for an industrial policy fit 
for the 21st century. Why we mobilize support for SMEs because we believe a strong dynamic 
industrial base is indispensable for a strong European economy.  
And whilst fighting climate change, our 20-20-20 goals have set our economy on the path to 
green growth and resource efficiency, reducing costs and creating jobs.  
By the end of this year, we will come out with concrete proposals for our energy and climate 
framework up to 2030. And we will continue to shape the international agenda by fleshing out 
a comprehensive, legally binding global climate agreement by 2015, with our partners. Europe 
alone cannot do all the fight for climate change. Frankly, we need the others also on board. At 
the same time, we will pursue our work on the impact of energy prices on competitiveness 
and on social cohesion. 
All these drivers for growth are part of our 'Europe 2020' agenda, and fully and swiftly 
implementing it is more urgent than ever. In certain cases, we need to go beyond the 2020 
agenda. 
This means we must also pursue our active and assertive trade agenda. It is about linking us 
closer to growing third markets and guaranteeing our place in the global supply chain. 
Contrary to perception, where most of our citizens think we are losing in global trade, we have 
a significant and increasing trade surplus of more than 300 billion euro a year, goods, 
services, and agriculture. We need to build on that. This too will demand our full attention in 
the months to come, notably with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with 
the US and the negotiations with Canada and Japan. 
And last but not least, we need to step up our game in implementing the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, the European budget. The EU budget is the most concrete lever we have at hand 
to boost investments. In some of our regions, the European Union budget is the only way to 
get public investment because they don't have the sources at national level. 
Both the European Parliament and the Commission wanted more resources. We have been in 
that fight together. But even so, one single year's EU budget represents more money - in 
today's prices - than the whole Marshall plan in its time! Let us now make sure that the 
programmes can start on the 1st of January 2014. That the results are being felt on the 
ground. And that we use the possibilities of innovative financing, from instruments that have 
already started, to EIB money, to project bonds.  
We have to make good on the commitment we have made in July. From the Commission's 
side, we will deliver. We will, for example, present the second amending budget for 2013 still 
this month. There is no time to waste, so I warn against holding it up. In particular, I urge 
member states not to delay.  
I cannot emphasise this enough: citizens will not be convinced with rhetoric and promises 
only, but only with a concrete set of common achievements. We have to show the many areas 
where Europe has solved problems for citizens. Europe is not the cause of problems, Europe is 
part of the solution.  
I address what we have to do still more extensively in today's letter to the President of the 
European Parliament, which you will also have received. I will not go now in detail regarding 
the programme for next year. 
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My point today is clear: together, there is a lot still to achieve before the elections. It is not 
the time to thrown in the towel, it is time to roll up our sleeves.  
 
Honourable Members, 
 
None of this is easy. These are challenging times, a real stress test for the EU. The path of 
permanent and profound reform is as demanding as it is unavoidable. Let's make no mistake: 
there is no way back to business as usual. Some people believe that after this everything will 
come back as it was before. They are wrong, This crisis is different. This is not a cyclical crisis, 
but a structural one. We will not come back to the old normal. We have to shape a new 
normal. We are in a transformative period of history. We have to understand that, and not 
just say it. But we have to draw all the consequences from that, including in our state of 
mind, and how we react to the problems.  
We see from the first results that it is possible. 
And we all know from experience that it is necessary.  
At this point in time, with a fragile recovery, the biggest downside risk I see is political: lack of 
stability and lack of determination. Over the last years we have seen that anything that casts 
doubt on governments' commitment to reform is instantly punished. On the positive side, 
strong and convincing decisions have an important and immediate impact.  
In this phase of the crisis, governments' job is to provide the certainty and predictability that 
markets still lack.  
Surely, you all know Justus Lipsius. Justus Lipsius is the name of the Council building in 
Brussels. Justus Lipsius was a very influential 16th century humanist scholar, who wrote a 
very important book called De Constantia.  
He wrote, 'Constancy is a right and immovable strength of the mind, neither lifted up nor 
pressed down with external or casual accidents.' Only a 'strength of the mind', he argued, 
based on 'judgment and sound reason', can help you through confusing and alarming times.  
I hope that in these times, these difficult times, all of us, including the governments' 
representatives that meet at the Justus Lipsius building, show that determination, that 
perseverance, when it comes to the implementation of the decisions taken. Because one of 
the issues that we have is to be coherent, not just take decisions, but afterwards be able to 
implement them on the ground.       
 
Honourable members, 
 
It is only natural that, over the last few years, our efforts to overcome the economic crisis 
have overshadowed everything else.  
But our idea of Europe needs to go far beyond the economy. We are much more than a 
market. The European ideal touches the very foundations of European society. It is about 
values, and I underline this word: values. It is based on a firm belief in political, social and 
economic standards, grounded in our social market economy.  
In today's world, the EU level is indispensable to protect these values and standards and 
promote citizens' rights: from consumer protection to labour rights, from women's rights to 
respect for minorities, from environmental standards to data protection and privacy. 
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Whether defending our interests in international trade, securing our energy provision, or 
restoring people's sense of fairness by fighting tax fraud and tax evasion: only by acting as a 
Union do we pull our weight at the world stage.  
Whether seeking impact for the development and humanitarian aid we give to developing 
countries, managing our common external borders or seeking to develop in Europe a strong 
security and defense policy: only by integrating more can we really reach our objectives.         
 
There is no doubt about it. Our internal coherence and international relevance are inextricably 
linked. Our economic attraction and political traction are fundamentally entwined. 
Does anyone seriously believe that, if the euro had collapsed, we or our Member States would 
still have any credibility left internationally? 
Does everyone still realise how enlargement has been a success in terms of healing history's 
deep scars, establishing democracies where no one had thought it possible? How 
neighbourhood policy was and still is the best way to provide security and prosperity in 
regions of vital importance for Europe? Where would we be without all of this? 
Today, countries like Ukraine are more than ever seeking closer ties to the European Union, 
attracted by our economic and social model. We cannot turn our back on them. We cannot 
accept any attempts to limit these countries own sovereign choices. Free will and free consent 
need to be respected. These are also the principles that lie at the basis of our Eastern 
Partnership, which we want to take forward at our summit in Vilnius. 
And does everyone still remember just how much Europe has suffered from its wars during 
the last century, and how European integration was the valid answer?  
Next year, it will be one century after the start of the First World War. A war that tore Europe 
apart, from Sarajevo to the Somme. We must never take peace for granted. We need to recall 
that it is because of Europe that former enemies now sit around the same table and work 
together. It is only because they were offered a European perspective that now even Serbia 
and Kosovo come to an agreement, under mediation of the EU.   
Last year's Nobel Peace Prize reminded us of that historic achievement: that Europe is a 
project of peace.  
We should be more aware of it ourselves. Sometimes I think we should not be ashamed to be 
proud. Not arrogant. But more proud. We should look towards the future, but with a wisdom 
we gained from the past.  
Let me say this to all those who rejoice in Europe's difficulties and who want to roll back our 
integration and go back to isolation: the pre-integrated Europe of the divisions, the war, the 
trenches, is not what people desire and deserve. The European continent has never in its 
history known such a long period of peace as since the creation of the European Community. 
It is our duty to preserve it and deepen it. 
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Honourable members, 
 
It is precisely with our values that we address the unbearable situation in Syria, which has 
tested, over the last months, the world's conscience so severely. The European Union has led 
the international aid response by mobilising close to 1.5 billion euros, of which €850 million 
comes directly from the EU budget. The Commission will do its utmost to help the Syrian 
people and refugees in neighbouring countries. 
We have recently witnessed events we thought had long been eradicated. The use of chemical 
weapons is a horrendous act that deserves a clear condemnation and a strong answer. The 
international community, with the UN at its centre, carries a collective responsibility to 
sanction these acts and to put an end to this conflict. The proposal to put Syria's chemical 
weapons beyond use is potentially a positive development. The Syrian regime must now 
demonstrate that it will implement this without any delay. In Europe, we believe that, 
ultimately, only a political solution stands a chance of delivering the lasting peace that the 
Syrian people deserve.  
 
Honourable members, 
 
There are those who claim that a weaker Europe would make their country stronger, that 
Europe is a burden; that they would be better off without it. 
My reply is clear: we all need a Europe that is united, strong and open. 
In the debate that is ongoing all across Europe, the bottom-line question is: Do we want to 
improve Europe, or give it up?   
My answer is clear: let's engage!  
If you don't like Europe as it is: improve it!  
Find ways to make it stronger, internally and internationally, and you will have in me the 
firmest of supporters. Find ways that allow for diversity without creating discriminations, and I 
will be with you all the way. 
But don't turn away from it.  
I recognize: as any human endeavor, the EU is not perfect.  
For example, controversies about the division of labour between the national and European 
levels will never be conclusively ended.  
I value subsidiarity highly. For me, subsidiarity is not a technical concept. It is a fundamental 
democratic principle. An ever closer union among the citizens of Europe demands that 
decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely to the people as possible. 
Not everything needs a solution at European level. Europe must focus on where it can add 
most value. Where this is not the case, it should not meddle. The EU needs to be big on big 
things and smaller on smaller things - something we may occasionally have neglected in the 
past. The EU needs to show it has the capacity to set both positive and negative priorities. As 
all governments, we need to take extra care of the quality and quantity of our regulation 
knowing that, as Montesquieu said, 'les lois inutiles affaiblissent les lois nécessaires'. ['Useless 
laws weaken the necessary ones'.] 
But there are, honourable members, areas of major importance where Europe must have 
more integration, more unity. Where only a strong Europe can deliver results.  
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I believe a political union needs to be our political horizon, as I stressed in last year's State of 
the Union. This is not just the demand of a passionate European. This is the indispensable way 
forward to consolidate our progress and ensure the future. 
Ultimately, the solidity of our policies, namely of the economic and monetary union, depend 
on the credibility of the political and institutional construct that supports it. 
So we have mapped out, in the Commission Blueprint for a deep and genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union, not only the economic and monetary features, but also the necessities, 
possibilities and limits of deepening our institutional set-up in the medium and long term. The 
Commission will continue to work for the implementation of its Blueprint, step by step, one 
phase after the other. 
And I confirm, as announced last year, the intention to present, before the European 
elections, further ideas on the future of our Union and how best to consolidate and deepen the 
community method and community approach in the longer term. That way, they can be 
subject to a real European debate. They will set out the principles and orientations that are 
necessary for a true political union. 
 
Honourable Members, 
 
We can only meet the challenges of our time if we strengthen the consensus on fundamental 
objectives.  
Politically, we must not be divided by differences between the euro area and those outside it, 
between the centre and the periphery, between the North and the South, between East and 
West. The European Union must remain a project for all members, a community of equals. 
Economically, Europe has always been a way to close gaps between countries, regions and 
people. And that must remain so. We cannot do member states' work for them. The 
responsibility remains theirs. But we can and must complement it with European responsibility 
and European solidarity.  
For that reason, strengthening the social dimension is a priority for the months to come, 
together with our social partners. The Commission will come with its communication on the 
social dimension of the economic and monetary union on the 2nd of October. Solidarity is a 
key element of what being part of Europe is all about, and something to take pride in. 
Safeguarding its values, such as the rule of law, is what the European Union was made to do, 
from its inception to the latest chapters in enlargement.  
In last year's State of the Union speech, at a moment of challenges to the rule of law in our 
own member states, I addressed the need to make a bridge between political persuasion and 
targeted infringement procedures on the one hand, and what I call the nuclear option of 
Article 7 of the Treaty, namely suspension of a member states' rights.  
Experience has confirmed the usefulness of the Commission role as an independent and 
objective referee. We should consolidate this experience through a more general framework. 
It should be based on the principle of equality between member states, activated only in 
situations where there is a serious, systemic risk to the rule of law, and triggered by pre-
defined benchmarks. 
The Commission will come forward with a communication on this. I believe it is a debate that 
is key to our idea of Europe. 
This does not mean that national sovereignty or democracy are constrained. But we do need a 
robust European mechanism to influence the equation when basic common principles are at 
stake.  
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There are certain non-negotiable values that the EU and its member states must and shall 
always defend. 
 
Honourable Members, 
 
The polarisation that resulted from the crisis poses a risk to us all, to the project, to the 
European project.  
We, legitimate political representatives of the European Union, can turn the tide. You, the 
democratic representatives of Europe, directly elected, will be at the forefront of the political 
debate. The question I want to pose is: which picture of Europe will voters be presented with? 
The candid version, or the cartoon version? The myths or the facts? The honest, reasonable 
version, or the extremist, populist version? It's an important difference. 
I know some people out there will say Europe is to blame for the crisis and the hardship. 
But we can remind people that Europe was not at the origin of this crisis. It resulted from 
mismanagement of public finances by national governments and irresponsible behaviour in 
financial markets. 
We can explain how Europe has worked to fix the crisis. What we would have lost if we hadn't 
succeeded in upholding the single market, because it was under threat, and the common 
currency, because some people predicted the end of the euro. If we hadn't coordinated 
recovery efforts and employment initiatives.  
Some people will say that Europe is forcing governments to cut spending.  
But we can remind voters that government debt got way out of hand even before the crisis, 
not because of but despite Europe. We can add that the most vulnerable in our societies, and 
our children, would end up paying the price if we don't persevere now. And the truth is that 
countries inside the euro or outside the euro, in Europe or outside Europe, they are making 
efforts to curb their very burdened public finances. 
Some will campaign saying that we have given too much money to vulnerable countries. 
Others will say we have given too little money to vulnerable countries. 
But every one of us can explain what we did and why: there is a direct link between one 
country's loans and another country's banks, between one country's investments and another 
country's businesses, between one country's workers and another country's companies. This 
kind of interdependence means only European solutions work.  
What I tell people is: when you are in the same boat, one cannot say: 'your end of the boat is 
sinking.'  We were in the same boat when things went well, and we are in it together when 
things are difficult. 
Some people might campaign saying: Europe has grabbed too much power. Others will claim 
Europe always does too little, too late. The interesting things is that sometimes we have the 
same people saying that Europe is not doing enough and at the same time that's not giving 
more means to Europe to do what Europe has to do.  
But we can explain that member states have entrusted Europe with tasks and competences. 
The European Union is not a foreign power. It is the result of democratic decisions by the 
European institutions and by member states. 
At the same time we must acknowledge that, in some areas, Europe still lacks the power to do 
what is asked of it. A fact that is all too easily forgotten by those, and there are many out 
there, who always like to nationalise success and Europeanise failure. Ultimately, what we 
have, and what we don't have, is the result of democratic decision-making. And I think we 
should remind people of that. 
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Ladies and gentlemen,  
Mr President,  
Honourable members, 
 
I hope the European Parliament will take up this challenge with all the idealism it holds, with 
as much realism and determination as the times demand of us. 
The arguments are there.  
The facts are there. 
The agenda has been set out. 
 
In 8 months' time, voters will decide. 
 
Now, it's up to us to make the case for Europe.  
We can do so by using the next 8 months to conclude as much as we can. We have a lot to do 
still.  
Adopt and implement the European budget, the MFF. This is critical for investment in our 
regions all over Europe. This is indispensable for the first priority we have: to fight against 
unemployment, notably youth unemployment.  
Advance and implement the banking union. This is critical to address the problem of financing 
for businesses and SMEs. 
These are our clear priorities: employment and growth. 
Our job is not finished. It is in its decisive phase. 
 
Because, Honourable Members, the elections will not only be about the European Parliament, 
nor will they be about the European Commission or about the Council or about this or that 
personality.  
They will be about Europe. 
We will be judged together. 
So let us work together - for Europe. 
With passion and with determination. 
 
Let us not forget: one hundred years ago –Europe was sleepwalking into the catastrophy of 
the war of 1914. 
Next year, in 2014, I hope Europe will be walking out of the crisis towards a Europe that is 
more united, stronger and open. 
 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
	   60	  
7. 2 Appendix 2 
 
AK Party Group Meeting June 25-2013 
Very distinguished guests, 
My very distinguished deputy friends, 
Ladies and Gentlemen: 
I salute you all with love and regards and I wish from Allah that our Group Meeting would be good 
for our country and nation. I welcome all our guests and thank them from the bottom of my heart 
for their excitement. At the beginning of our meeting I want to share some good news. As part of 
FATİH Project we have taken the first step for distributing free tablet computers to our 10.6 million 
students. The winner of the bid would have to found an R&D center and invest in Turkey within 
next three years. I wish this revolutionary development would be good for our teachers, students, 
and their families. 
Last February I announced that our handicapped citizens would also be appointed to teaching 
positions and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies has quickly made the necessary 
arrangements with the contributions of the Ministry of National Education. So staring today we are 
taking the online applications until July 1st for appointing 600 teachers in 46 different subjects for 
the next school year. 
My distinguished deputy friends, 
We are making another important arrangement that paves the way for contract-based state 
employees to obtain permanent state tenure. This arrangement would enable 96,500 personnel to 
obtain the permanent tenure and we hope to pass this law before the parliament goes to summer 
break. 
My very distinguished deputy friends, 
Distinguished guests, 
Last week we have received the intense affection of our people just like we are witnessing now in 
this room. On June 9th we attended the opening ceremony of the Mediterranean Games in Mersin 
for which we invested 800 million TL. Greece was supposed to host these games but due to the 
financial difficulties they are having we were asked to take over. Within only 17 months we have 
finished all the preparation work and hosted these games and 6,000 athletes from 24 countries. Our 
citizens in Mersin have showed a great interest to these games and the attendance is very 
impressive. So far Turkey has won 16 bronze, 21 silver, and 19 gold medals and ranks second in 
total only trailing Italy. This will very likely be the most successful Mediterranean Games of our 
history and for that I want to thank all our athletes. I also wish the best to the athletes of all our 
fellow Mediterranean countries. I hope they will leave with great memories. I also wish speedy 
recovery to our national athlete Binnaz Uslu. 
My distinguished deputy friends, 
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Our next stop was Kayseri where I attended the opening ceremony of the FIFA U-20 World Cup 
and to our Respect to Will of Nation rally. Istanbul, Bursa, Antalya, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Rize, and 
Kayseri are hosting the tournament and I watched the first half of the opening match between Cuba 
and South Korea. I wish all the success to our national team in this tournament. Prior to the match 
we had our rally with the enthusiastic participation of 200,000 citizens. I want to thank all our 
citizens in Kayseri for their support and I want to thank our organization in Kayseri for their 
success. The level of enthusiasm and excitement is growing in our every rally. 
We had another Respect for Will of Nation rally on Saturday in Samsun and it was the greatest rally 
I have ever had in Samsun. The next day we had our rally in Erzurum again with the participation 
of an excited crowd. The day before Nationalistic Movement Party had a rally in Erzurum and the 
attendance was not anywhere near to ours. All these rallies have reflected very clearly how our 
people react to the recent protests and acts of violence in Turkey. Our people patiently watched 
those protests but that same wisdom also enabled them to see the big picture. There was an 
intentional disinformation campaign since the beginning of the protests and yet thousands of people 
did not believe in any of it. They came to our rallies to show their support for us. We have been 
telling everyone if they want to use their democratic rights they should be arranging rallies in 
squares and not engage in any violent behavior. Those who use violence are destined to lose. 
Democratic rights can only be exercised in legal rallies and elections. Those who organized and 
provoked these protests knew they would not be able to influence our people. They actually wanted 
to reach out to the international circles from the beginning, as they knew our people would not 
believe them. That is why they have been writing and talking in English. They have been searching 
for outside support. 
My distinguished friends, 
The protestors come from very different segments of society and they were out there for different 
reasons. We have never turned our back to our people for the past 10.5 years. We have always 
listened the demands of every different group without discriminating against any race, language, 
and belief. There were some among the protestors who were genuinely concerned for the trees and 
the environment and we have listened their arguments, as we believed in their sincerity. There were, 
however, some that had no sincerity or honesty in their cause and intentions. They cannot tell the 
AK Party Government that the governor and some other people need to be fired. They have no right 
to tell us what to do. Our people give us this authority and responsibility. 
I want to remind everyone that prior to the AK Party Governments we had coalition governments in 
our country that on average lasted for 16 months. These short-lived governments led to instability 
and the GDP per capita fell as low as $2,600. AK Party has come and changed everything. An era 
of stability and consistency has started. Turkey has made a big leap forward in every field. Turkey 
has become a country that is widely respected in all over the world. So they wanted to weaken this 
powerful Turkey with this organized scheme but our people have sided with the AK Party 
Government and did not fall for this vicious scheme. 
It is not like the protests in Brazil where people argue against a 20-cent raise or lack of healthcare 
implementations. However, I think the protests in Brazil have also been started by foreign 
perpetuators since Brazil has just paid off its debt to IMF just like we did. We said it was the 
interest rate lobby from the beginning that was unhappy for the headway we have made in 
economy. 
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I said this in our group meeting last week: CHP’s impotence in providing strong and effective 
opposition has made its electorate hopeless. This hopeless mass went out to the streets and CHP has 
viciously provoked this mass by calling for violence. Unfortunately we have also witnessed that our 
Alevi citizens participated these protests as a group. We understand their feelings and demands. As 
you know we had an Alevi initiative and met with their representatives many times. This process 
will resume but we need to solve these issues on the negotiation table. Past mistakes should not be 
repeated. When Dersim Massacre took place CHP was the ruling party in Turkey and they have 
never showed a reaction to this massacre. I, as the Prime Minister of this era, apologized for that 
incident. Chairman of CHP has not apologized yet and still has not acknowledged that CHP was 
responsible for it. Our Government has worked hard to solve the problems of our Alevi citizens just 
like we would do for any religious belief. The problems have not been fully addressed yet but no 
one can claim that we are not sincerely working for a solution. 
For decades CHP had supposedly represented our Alevi citizens yet CHP is responsible for the 
Dersim Massacre. What did CHP do for our Alevi citizen and their problems when it was part of the 
coalition governments of the past? CHP was part of the coalition government in charge when the 
incidents took place in Kahramanmaraş, Sivas, and Gazi Mahallesi. CHP could not stop these 
incidents from happening and also did not do anything to bring those who were responsible for 
them to the justice. I know very well that in recent years CHP has been part of dirty plans such as 
the bombing in Reyhanlı and the recent Gezi Park protests and to provoke our Alevi citizens. I want 
our Alevi brothers and sisters to be aware this dirty and dangerous game. We should move forward 
by increasing our hopes of a better future instead of living in the sorrows of the past. God willing 
we will solve any problem we have in our country, as we have done in the past. Violence, tension, 
and conflict would definitely not help in solving the problems. We will solve our problems by 
talking and within the confines of democracy and law. We will move forward by tackling the 
problems of our entire 76 million citizens. Once again I want everyone, especially our Alevi 
citizens, to be very careful against the irresponsible and dangerous provocations of CHP deputies. 
CHP deputies and chairman keep blaming me for being a dictator but they need to look at the 
history of CHP and pictures of “national chief”, who is responsible for the Dersim Massacre, 
hanging on the walls of their headquarters if they want to see a dictator. If they want to see a fascist 
dictator they should look at al-Assad whom they are so fond of. 
My very distinguished deputy friends, 
Dear guests, 
Among the protestors there are some who aim to attack the government and the will of nation rather 
than using their democratic rights for innocent and righteous demands. Those who saw the dirty 
scenario and the violence and vandalism distanced themselves from those people who had a 
different agenda. Unfortunately many young people were used as part of this scenario. We have 
been stern against those with ill intentions. We have fought against military coup scenarios to take 
us away from our duty. There have been many scenarios and plots that aimed to unlawfully take us 
away from the governing role that was given to us by democratic elections. However, we would 
never back down from our duty to our people. As long as we have our people’s support, we would 
never back down from serving our people and representing the will of nation. 
Since the beginning of the protests there have been an organized effort to portray as if the police is 
using excessive force against innocent, peaceful, and right protestors. Social media and certain 
media companies have been used to this end. International media has become part of this and those 
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who realized that they would not be able to come back to power by democratic means have 
orchestrated this scheme. However, my citizens did not believe in any of these and they came to our 
rallies to show their support. 
CHP is acting with illegal organizations and that is why they will never be rewarded with the 
support of our people. They call themselves a political party and yet police have found numerous 
weapons in their party building. Also Divan Hotel was sheltering those who attacked the police so 
the police had to go in and arrest those people. Protestors invaded Atatürk Cultural Center and 
hanged posters of illegal organizations and signs that insulted the Prime Ministers. When I came 
back from my trip to North Africa, they were still there so I instructed that they all should be taken 
out within 24 hours. I wanted the Gezi Park to be cleared from the invaders within 24 hours because 
Gezi Park belongs to our people. Laws require us to prevent any form of invasion of public areas. I 
told everyone who came to visit me that we need to wait for the court to reach a verdict on the 
proposed plan. No one can do anything until the court says the final word. I also said even if the 
court rules in favor of the plan we would still take it to public vote. However, this whole Gezi Park 
thing is just an excuse to cause unrest in Turkey. Turkey was going great in May. We had the $49 
billion bid for the third airport in Istanbul, $22 billion bid for the nuclear power plant, and $2.5 
billion bid for the third bridge on Bosporus. From healthcare to education, everything was going 
great in Turkey. So what is there to protest really? Our young people are falling for the schemes of 
certain circles and they are being used. If they really want to make a difference they should be part 
of NGOs and our Government lowered the age requirement to be a member of parliament so they 
can run for parliament. We are even working on taking this age limit further down to 18 while the 
opposition parties oppose it even though there are many examples of such low age limits in many 
European countries. We already have deputies at the Assembly under the age of 30. So our 
youngsters should know which political party is looking for them and for their rights. We want to 
move forward with the contributions of our young people. 
Some media companies only promote how the protestors respected the religious sensitivities but 
they are not telling people how the protestors entered the mosques with their shoes on and drank 
alcohol in mosques. Fortunately our people did not fall for these provocations. Otherwise very 
dangerous developments could have taken place. Some police officers might have done wrong 
things and the Ministry is already investigating these incidents. However, in general our police have 
been the side that suffered from violence. They threw hundreds of stones to our police and they 
drew graffiti using very foul language. They want us to overlook all these. They made loud noises 
late at night and disturbed everyone. They claimed to be environmentalists and yet they damaged 
trees on the streets. We cannot ignore all these and we will continue to stand tall against all these. 
They insulted our electorate and blamed them for selling their votes in exchange for money and 
food. They insulted our sacred values such as headscarf, mosques, and flag. We cannot tolerate such 
behavior. So when the election time comes our people will reveal their judgment on these vandals 
and looters for what they tried to do the will of nation. However, if we remain silent then they will 
question us as well. 
My distinguished brothers and sisters, 
As you know the Chairman of People’s Republican Party and the leaders of European countries are 
exchanging letters. They are collaborating for starting a sectarian conflict in Turkey and this 
exchange of letters could not be a coincidence. There are dozens of unnatural connections. 
Curiously a Turkish representative of an international media company tweeted and asked people to 
stop consuming for 6 months so that the Turkish economy would suffer and the Government would 
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have to listen them. For the love of Allah what sort of a mentality is this? How could someone 
betray his own country like this? Could this be called journalism or freedom of press? How could a 
Turkish citizen make such a call? This is not about Gezi Park as they said. They just want to 
prevent democracy and economy from working in Turkey. They want to weaken our economy so 
that AK Party would weaken. They do not care about what would happen to Turkey. We would 
never tolerate such a mentality and vandalism. The protestors are used as part of a plan to damage 
Turkey’s international reputation and influence. These protests were used as part of the plot that 
aimed to damage Turkey’s economy and tourism. In coordination with their European counterparts, 
they have reported false and exaggerated news to foreign sources in order to cloud the investment 
climate in Turkey. They tried to create an artificial unrest and an air of instability. Some tried to 
derive benefits by the way of manipulation. I am very pleased to say that these plans did not work. 
The reforms we made in the past 10.5 years prevented this plot from reaching its target. Investors 
still have high confidence in our country, economy, democracy, and future. They keep on investing 
in our country. Recently some portfolio investments exited but that is due to the global financial 
tendencies. Rest assured that a greater amount of portfolio investments would come to Turkey in 
near future. We have helped as much as we can to all the investors in Turkey and we know 
investment brings employment and economic growth. We will keep welcoming any form of 
investment to our country as long as they believe in Turkey. 
Very distinguished guests, 
My very distinguished deputy friends, 
These protestors also targeted the solution process, which progresses with great success. I am happy 
to report that my Kurdish brothers and sisters have realized that these protests targeted our 
fellowship and thus they did not fall for this plot just as almost all our citizens did not. These 
protests aimed to weaken our unity and fellowship but they end up strengthening our fellowship and 
unity. 
Tomorrow we will have the final meeting of the advisory board and they will turn in their report. 
We will discuss and evaluate their findings. After receiving this final input, we will announce our 
road map and move forward decisively. We are going through historic times, as we end the problem 
of terror that has existed for the past 30 years. Our fellowship is growing and strengthening by the 
day. Once we solve the issue of terrorism, the other problems such as the issues of our Alevi 
brothers and sisters will be solved quickly as well. Our economy and democracy will soar to new 
heights. Turkey will move up to a whole different level. 
We have always been the Government of our entire 76 million citizens even though we have only 
received 50 percent of the votes. One can clearly see this by the investments we made. We made 
more investments in the East and South East than we did in the West. It is important to note that we 
are building a Turkey where our differences make us richer and stronger and everyone’s lifestyle is 
well respected. We have never discriminated among our citizens. We will live in a Turkey where 
we bravely tackle our problems instead of postponing them. We will thrive on our common values 
and fellowship. We will face those who attacked our nation’s will, democracy, and economy in the 
next elections. 
My very distinguished deputy friends, 
Next Tuesday we will elect the new Speaker of Parliament and I wish from Allah that this new 
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Speaker of Parliament would be good for our Assembly and country. May Allah clear your path and 
be on your side. I salute you all with love and regards. God bless. 
7. 3 Appendix 3: Interview questions and answers 
7.3.1 Interview with Omer Taspinar 
 
Interview guide 
 
Dear Omer Taspinar  
 
First and foremost I want to thank you for the inspiring lecture you gave at the Faculty of Law at 
University of Copenhagen on the 4th October, on liberalism and democracy in the Turkish model.  
 
After the lecture I approached you with a wish that you might be willing to answer a few questions. 
My earnest intent is that these questions and answers will serve the purpose of empirical support 
and take part in my thesis as an expert interview. 
 
I am currently writing my thesis, to finish my master of arts in European studies at Lund University; 
my main area of interest is the potential membership of Turkey in the EU.  
The research focus or current hypothesis of this paper is; The European Union’s hesitation to 
accept Turkey as a full member is due to cultural and religious reasons.  
With this hypothesis as a starting point I want to research the Copenhagen Criteria – and the double 
standards I believe to be surrounding these criteria of accession, mainly depending on which 
country or culture is applying, and not how successfully they have implemented the asked 
measures.   
Arguments for or against Turkey becoming a member of the EU will be based on theories of 
identity and nationalism, primary sources being Anthony D. Smith and Steven J. Mock. 
Furthermore my thesis will be supported by the theory of soft power by Joseph E. Nye. 
I plan to make a comparative analysis of Hungary and Turkey and how well the two countries are 
currently complying with the Copenhagen criteria, and from this find arguments that support my 
hypothesis of culture and religion being a main obstacle for Turkey becoming a full member of the 
EU.  
 
I hope that you, after having read this short description on my thoughts behind the thesis, have 
found interest and would like to answer some questions.   
 
I imagine that you do not have much time to spare; any help would be greatly appreciated.  
 
The following is a short series of questions. My intention with this kind of questionnaire is to ask 
open questions that will leave room for you to elaborate and give you the opportunity to be more 
specific in any area of particular interest.  
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Questions 
 
Would you say a Turkish membership is as attractive today for the EU, as it was 10, 20 or 50 
years ago?  -  What potential benefits or disadvantages could a Turkish membership bring to 
the European Union? 
 
The main benefits for the EU will be strategic. Since Turkey is already in the customs unions there 
is no trade or financial benefits. But I don't think the EU is taken seriously in foreign policy, partly 
because it is not an actor in the Middle East. With Turkey in the union it will have to have  a more 
serious foreign policy towards the region.  
  
Turkey have since the Ankara agreement in 1963 been given prospects of accession into the 
European Union. This process has now lasted more than 50 years. What effect has this 
process had on democracy in Turkey? 
  
Overall very positive, Especially the AKP's democratization of Turkey between 2003 and 2005 was 
thanks to the harmonization efforts with EU legislation. In the absence of EU prospects and vision, 
Turkey's democracy risks sliding backwards, as we are currently witnessing.  
  
 In your lecture you said that you believe liberal democracies can live along side Sharia - One 
could argue that religious law such as Sharia is one of the major reasons why many 
Europeans are against Turkey becoming a member of the EU. In your opinion, how could this 
fear of religion or of different cultures be dealt with? 
  
The backlash against multiculturalism in Europe is a big problem that can only solved with a 
balance between integration and multiculturalism. The two should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive.  I don't think Sharia is the reason why Europeans are against Turkey. Turkey is the most 
secular and democratic country in the Islamic world. I also don't think it's useful to talk about the 
compatibility of sharia and democracy since there is no consensus on what these concepts mean in 
the Islamic world and in the West.  
  
 New reform changes in Hungary indicate a step back for democracy. In your opinion, what 
might be done within the EU to ensure that member countries keep their promise to the 
signed treaties and their promise to implement and uphold the Copenhagen Criteria?  
  
There should be a new law that enables the EU to expel a country that no longer respects 
democracy and liberalism.  
 
  
Turkey is still trying to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Looking at Hungary, the EU 
have difficulties ensuring that membership countries respect basic principals after becoming 
members. Would you argue that this is as an advantage or disadvantage in terms of Turkey’s 
chances of accession and why? 
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Some people may fear that Turkey could become like Hungary if  it is allowed to become an EU 
member. This could work against Turkey's membership. But there are many other reasons to say no 
to Turkey in the eyes of skeptics.  
  
What do you think are the main reason(s) for the EU hesitating to accept Turkey as a full 
member? 
 
For the European right the main problem is Turkey's Islamic character. For the centrists it is 
Turkey's size and the fear of immigration and unemployment in Europe. For the left it is the fact 
that Turkey is not democratic and liberal enough.  
 
  
If you see cultural and/or religious reasons, please describe these.  
 
Islamophobia, the backlash against multiculturalism, the gender equality question are all relevant in 
the eyes of many Europeans.  
7.3.2 Interview with Daniella Kuzmanovic  
 
Questions:  
 
What do you think are the main reason(s) for the EU hesitating to accept Turkey as a full 
member? 
If you see cultural and/or religious reasons, please describe these.  
 
First, one has to be aware that it is difficult to talk about the EU as one voice with regard to the 
issue of Turkish membership. Thus the main reasons behind the skepticism towards Turkish EU 
membership vary according to the political actors you look at. If one look at the official stance of 
the EU (i.e. the Commission) they treat the Turkish membership negotiations as an on-going and 
partly technical issue of implementation of chapters consisting of rules and regulations. Here the 
evaluation is performed in the yearly progress report according to how the process has run, how 
many chapters are completed/open/blocked, and the Copenhagen criteria, where the economic part 
is fulfilled whereas the political part of the criteria are as of yet not according to the Commission.  
However, the Commission at the same time reflects the internal disagreements about Turkey among 
the membership countries, for example with regard to the chapters that have been blocked among 
other due to the Cyprus issue. It is this disagreement that is crucial with regard to the hesitancy 
towards Turkey. Again this hesitancy then has different reasons. One, as has particularly been the 
case with France under Sarkozy but which is a current in most EU member states particularly 
among right-wing, nationalist parties, has to do with a notion of Turkey as not European or not 
European enough for cultural as well as religious reasons. This is what I would call the value 
argument. The muslimness of Turkey is here used to create one kind of unbridgeable difference 
between Turkey and Europe, just as the lack of democracy, rights, and rule of law is highlighted as 
a sign of Turkey’s inability to develop what these actors perceive as inherent European values. IN 
the eyes of proponents of such argument should Turkey become member it would challenge the 
whole notion of a European common community. But a second and other kind of hesitancy has 
more to do with the size of Turkey. Should Turkey become member it would be the second largest 
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country in the EU, which would completely shift the internal power balance within the union. This 
is a concern raised for example by several leading politicians in Germany (the biggest country). 
These concerns have little to do with culture and religion and a lot to do with power politics, and I 
suspect that this is actually a concern which has a much broader resonance among the political 
actors in the EU system. 
 
Would you say a Turkish membership is as attractive today for the EU, as it was 10, 20 or 50 
years ago?  -  What potential benefits or disadvantages could a Turkish membership bring to the 
European Union? 
 
The geo-political circumstances have completely changes so I think the first part of the question is 
difficult to answer. But I guess I would say that Turkish membership has become more attractive 
for the EU sicne Turkey has undergone change from an economically weak state with little regional 
leverage to a state which experiences economic growth and has a stronger role to play in the region 
in which it is located. Turkey has in that sense become a more attractive partner. However, 
economically speaking integration is already in place with the customs union signed in 1996, and 
EU is still by far the most important trading partner for Turkey and foreign direct investor.  
Politically speaking there would be several advantages to Turkish EU membership, first the EU 
would become even bigger and thus more powerful. It would also secure a strategic partner in the 
Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asian regions. But such advantages are also weaknesses. A 
bigger EU could more easily disintegrate and it will be more difficult to create unity among its 
members on the various issues pertaining to the EU – this is difficult enough as it is now! Turkey is 
situated in a volatile region, and unless its various disputes with other power holders in the region is 
solved the EU could easily face security concerns. A common foreign policy will also be 
increasingly difficult should Turkey join since Turkey and the EU differ for example in relation to 
Middle East policy. 
The energy question is important here, since Turkey is attempting to become the main hub for oil 
and natural gas transportation from the region to among other the European markets. EU depends 
on Russia right now, but would no doubt prefer to have a stable, accommodating supplier (Turkey), 
however this would increase Turkish influence within the union vis-à-vis traditional countries like 
Germany and France. 
 
 
 
Turkey is still trying to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria. Looking at the current debate 
about Hungary, the EU arguably have difficulties ensuring that membership countries respect 
democratic principals after becoming members. 
In your opinion, what might be done within the EU to ensure that member countries keep their 
promise to the signed treaties and their promise to implement and uphold the Copenhagen 
Criteria?  
 
I would prefer not to answer this question since I am not a scholar on the EU but on Turkey.  	  
 
